Foreign Secretary and Governor. Thank you very much for this introduction. In fact I feel very unlike Bulstrode Whitelocke today since my wife and children were very keen to come to Uppsala. When I was interviewed by two Swedish journalists last Friday, they told me that I was very fortunate to come to Uppsala at this time of year. They said that it was a beautiful town and I would be seeing it at the best time. I can only agree with what I was told as Uppsala is indeed a beautiful town and I certainly have arrived at the best time of year.
I am the Lord Chancellor in Britain and in some ways Bulstrode Whitelocke was my predecessor, although Oliver Cromwell also set about abolishing the role of Lord Chancellor. Bulstrode Whitelocke - what a splendid name! - was sent as Ambassador to Sweden at a critical period in British history, during Cromwell's Protectorate. In this country too, it was a fateful moment: the year of Queen Christina's abdication; the last year in the life of Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna; and the year in which Charles the Tenth, one of your greatest monarchs, came to the throne. Bulstrode Whitelocke's account of his Embassy - especially of his time in Uppsala and in this castle negotiating the Treaty we are here to celebrate - is one of the fullest that exists of an extraordinary time.
Let me first say a little about the context; and then a few words about the Treaty itself, and its continuing significance.
The context first. Oliver Cromwell wanted international recognition. He was at war with the Dutch who would not recognise his coup d'etat in England. He badly needed an alliance with Protestant Sweden, which was one of Europe's Great Powers, having consolidated the victories of Gustavus Adolphus in the 30 Years War. He also wanted freedom of passage through the Baltic Sound for British merchant shipping - though Sweden was in no position at that time to offer it. Sweden, for its part, had practical concerns. It was fed up with having its ships seized by the British, in acts of almost blatant piracy, and then having to sue for their return. Queen Christina wanted to confirm her own place - and Sweden's - at the top table of European powers. But she had a pressing personal concern, too. She was on the point of abdicating and converting to Catholicism and she wanted to build her international profile.
Bulstrode Whitelocke, as that post developed into that of Lord Chancellor, I can only echo the reflection that he committed to his diary in 1647. He had not been 'contriving of it' he said, 'knowing that such an imployment is not desireable by a quiet and prudent Spirit. It seldom affords quiet, never safety.'
Be that as it may, the Treaty that Whitelocke negotiated - in Latin, 350 years ago on the very ground where we stand - was thoroughly modern in several respects:
First, and most importantly, it sought to establish a contractual basis for long-term peace and amity between our nations. Perpetual peace, indeed (the 1654 Treaty was nothing if not ambitious). 350 years is a solid start, you will agree.
Second, it placed a heavy stress on the rule of law. The citizens of each country were to be subject to the laws of the other and not - in the delicious phrase used in the English translation - to the 'passions of private persons.'
Third, the Treaty was eminently practical. 'In cases of wreck' for example 'the unhappy shall be kindly relieved and assisted for a proper reward'. Significantly - facing up to real-life complications instead of trying to bury them in optimistic rhetoric - the Treaty accepted that each nation would remain free to trade with enemies of the other as long as 'the goods they carry be not deemed contraband.'
Fourth, the Treaty was rooted in free trade with 'all impediments to navigation and commerce instantly removed on both sides'. Practical aid to the commerce of the other 'in the several seas where they respectively trade' was specified, indeed, as the 'primary institution of this Treaty.'
Freedom of movement was another central feature of the Treaty, with subjects of either state, as well as their ships and effects, not to be 'liable to arrests or stoppages for public use'.
There are many other modern features which have been identified, I hope, at the symposium which took place today at Uppsala University - on the occasion of today's anniversary - on the role of Parliaments in Treaty-making. I would comment on only one other: that fish were a problem then as they are today. 'The catching of herrings and other fish,' unlike perpetual peace, was too slippery a project for this Treaty and was specified for subsequent agreement.
The 1654 Treaty, in short, is one of which both countries can be justly proud - and one which underlines the depth of the friendship between Britain and Sweden as well as its long endurance. That friendship has endured a few strains. In 1810, for example, Napoleon forced the Swedes to declare war on Britain. Luckily the spirit of the 1654 Treaty prevailed: the Governor of Gothenburg had himself rowed out to deliver the Declaration of War in person to the British fleet anchored outside his city. They discussed how best to maintain the flow of trade despite this little complication, and then organised a three-day-long party on one of the English ships. As it has been nicely put: 'the Swedes declared war, and we have been dancing ever since.'
Today, we carry forward our friendship in the European Union. We share a very great deal in our approach to that project too. Again and again we find ourselves on the same side of the debate - for enlargement, for open trade, for budgetary discipline, for less but better regulation, and for a Union rooted in its separate Member States rather than one predicated on their gradual amalgamation.
It is in that spirit that I am proud to sign the Declaration before us, on behalf of my Government.