I would like to talk to you tonight about constitutional reform. I am delighted to be able to do this at the invitation of UCL's Constitution Unit. Not only because of the distinguished audience that is before me, but because of the ideals that UCL embodies.
Although this University was first established by James Mill and Henry Brougham, its spiritual father was Jeremy Bentham. Today Bentham is little read and little understood beyond a caricature of the cold, unfeeling Utilitarian. We often fail to remember that his doctrine of Utilitarianism - 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' - was, in fact, a radical and progressive philosophy which emerged from the impatient optimism of the European Enlightenment.
It was his faith in human capacity, in extending education to all and challenging the traditions of privilege which meant UCL was the first university in England to admit students of any race, class or religion. It was also the first to welcome women on equal terms with men.
It was his belief that Britain's archaic constitutional and legal arrangements were an affront to rational government and a cloak for injustice which led him to become such an intellectual pioneer of reform. Bentham, as he himself put it, had no time for the 'mechanical veneration for antiquity.' Instead, he wanted to 'cleanse the Augean stable' of jurisprudence and end the obfuscation of tradition. The modern citizen of the Enlightenment deserved, he believed, a clear and comprehensible legal and political framework.
I could not claim to be involved in any such grandiose scheme, but I would like to suggest that my Department, the Department for Constitutional Affairs, is committed to similar values of openness, rationalism, and indeed radicalism.
That is what I want to talk to you about this evening: the values that drive this Government's agenda of constitutional reform. And with a fifth of all the bills in The Queen's Speech - the largest number of any department in Whitehall - the actions of DCA are at the very heart of this Government's legislative programme. For this is not simply a matter of abstract theory. Rather, it is about issues on which the government is focussing its attention and its energies.
From the political Left and Right, many have questioned why this Government remains so committed to constitutional reform. Why has it now created a new Department to provide a focus for this work? Why it doesn't simply focus more on so-called 'bread and butter' issues?
The answer is twofold. Firstly, it is concentrating on key delivery issues, in education, in health, in crime - in my own department on both civil and criminal justice, and continuing to strive for the ambition of the post-war Attlee government not just of education for all and of a health service for all but of justice for all. And secondly, because the constitutional issue at stake is one of the most important in a liberal democracy - the relationship between citizens and the state. It is a relationship that will affect vitally our whole public sphere and our public services.
Since 1997 this Government has been involved in a sustained attempt to revive and redefine that relationship for the twenty-first century. Three progressive values have underpinned our approach to constitutional reforms:
The first has been to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of our public institutions
The second has been to strengthen our democracy and public engagement with decision-making
The third has been to increase trust and accountability in public bodies
These are not abstract values, but values that have an impact in everyday lives. But they are also necessarily political values. They reflect our broader belief in the virtue of the public sphere. In contrast to those who would prefer the state to wither on the vine, this Government believes passionately in the necessity of reform in order to preserve and enhance our public services and our political institutions. And it is equally important that we succeed in establishing the success and merit of these changes in the eyes of citizens. Our public institutions must be, and must be seen to be, relevant to the needs of our society in the 21st century.
There is, I believe, a dissonance between our values as citizens of a liberal democracy and some of our constitutional arrangements. We should not ignore that dissonance. If, for example, we believe in equal opportunity and do not accept that education or jobs should be distributed according to which family you were born into, then why should our legislature include hereditary peers? Shouldn't we have the courage of our convictions, especially when it comes to deciding something so fundamental as our constitutional arrangements?
The dissonance that I have mentioned forms the mainspring of all constitutional change. The constitution of this country has been good at changing. We cannot effect lasting constitutional change unless we learn from history.
We must ground our changes in history. We must understand that history shows us we cannot afford to stand still. A profound respect for and understanding of the development of our constitution should tutor us in our forward-looking agenda on the constitution. The strength of the changes we currently propose, the drive for the radicalism which underpins them, comes from seeing them in their historical context.
Our programme of reform stems logically from our progressive values and a firm belief that there is a careful balance to maintain, between preserving the UK's constitutional heritage on the one hand, and running the risk of our public institutions becoming antiquated on the other. A system of Government cannot remain in thrall to the past; it must be credible and it must be effective. Sometimes it can achieve this by virtue of its heritage; sometimes change is required. Our guide is whether reform augments, first, the credibility and effectiveness of our public institutions.
This brings me to the first of the reforms that my Department is now pursuing and which relates to my own position. As well as being the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, I remain, for the present time, the Lord Chancellor. The office of Lord Chancellor has however become increasingly difficult to justify. The public perception is of an antiquated office. We need now to separate out the distinct roles of the Lord Chancellor and clarify the relationship between the independent judiciary, the executive, and the legislature.
It is, I think, just the kind of rational reform - stripping away confusing traditions; introducing transparent, comprehensible systems of governance - which Jeremy Bentham would have approved of, and - perhaps more importantly - the kind of reform which people elect progressive governments to carry through.
The role of the Lord Chancellor has gone through so many changes in its long history. But two particular aspects have remained consistent. First, the Lord Chancellor has always had an important role in delivering justice. And second, whilst he is the chief judge, he is nevertheless located firmly in the executive.
My Department is responsible for the delivery of public services, including, most prominently, the running of the justice system. Every day, thousands of people rely on this system. It is fundamental to their rights, to their liberty, and to social justice. I passionately believe that my Department has a leading role as a mainstream public service delivery Department. Politics matters when it comes to the delivery of public services and my role should therefore be a political one, not one shrouded in ancient custom. In particular, I should not be the head of the judiciary.
My accountability to Parliament must be clear and so it is better that I be a Secretary of State. The possibility of any aspect of my accountability being diffused by the various roles filled by the Lord Chancellor should be excluded. This will improve not only the credibility, but, I hope, the effectiveness of our system of justice.
As I speak about the inherently political nature of my role, I am also acutely conscious of the role that the Lord Chancellor plays in appointing judges and in safeguarding the independence of the judiciary. As the office of Lord Chancellor as such is abolished, this Government will take the opportunity to renew and strengthen the long-standing partnership between the executive and the judiciary. My role as Secretary of State is a political one. I should be responsive to the needs and values of citizens. I should answer to Parliament.
Judges are and should remain in a different position. They must have proper judicial independence.
I believe that judicial independence is so important, so vital to this country, that it now needs to be enshrined in law. That is what I announced last week. That is what will be in the legislation which we will bring forward.
Judges should be deciding cases without fear or favour as they do at the moment. The politicians should be responsive to the public's agenda. The distinction is and should be clear. Judges do judging and politicians do politics.
Ultimately, we want a justice system that is credible and effective. For this, the executive and the judiciary must work together, but in such a way that their distinct roles and responsibilities are clear. These distinctions are not clear so long as we have the present office of the Lord Chancellor. If the relationship between the executive and the judiciary is embodied in one person, in one ancient office, we cannot properly scrutinise its operation and it is not immediately transparent to the public. Our reforms will ensure that there is clarity in the relationship between the executive and the judiciary; a relationship, I believe, at the core of our constitutional arrangements.
Could I turn to a couple of specifics. One crucial aspect of the relationship between the executive and the judiciary is the making of judicial appointments.
We, in the UK, have some well-developed answers as to what qualities our judges should manifest. Other countries come to us to understand our answers. We help them to improve their own judicial systems.
What are our answers? We want our judges to be independent, fair, and impartial. We want our judges to have excellent minds. We want our judges to have sound judgement. We want judges that are sensitive to people and to society.
Since 1997, the appointments system has been made more efficient, more effective, and more open. Through the application of clear criteria, interviews, consultation, and audit, this Government has worked towards further embedding the issues of merit. However, more can be done to ensure that judicial independence is protected in the years ahead.
Included in The Queen's Speech was legislation for the creation of an independent judicial appointments commission. This commission will be a part of a demonstrably open, transparent, and independent appointments process. I also hope that it will help to increase judicial diversity by opening up the appointments process and encouraging applications from traditionally under-represented groups such as women and minorities. We have just appointed the first woman to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. The trends towards greater diversity must, and will, continue. Diversity too relates not only to credibility; it is central to effectiveness.
In the same piece of legislation, the Government proposes to create a distinct Supreme Court. The Law Lords will be taken out of the House of Lords and set up in a separate Supreme Court. People are increasingly sensitive to the need to underline that our judicial system is independent of both the executive and the legislature. The present arrangements, whereby the highest court in the land sits under the guise of a committee of the House of Lords, are obscure and appear to compromise the independence of the judiciary. It need not be the case that this independence has, in fact, been compromised; however, the perception of inadequate separation exists.
We are not proposing any fundamental change in the nature of the Court. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty will remain. The Court will not be able to strike down legislation in the manner of such courts elsewhere. Our Supreme Court will be true to our constitutional heritage. However, I do believe that by establishing a distinct Supreme Court, for the whole of the UK, we shall enhance the credibility of the judicial system in the eyes of citizens. A distinct Supreme Court, quite definitively outwith the legislature, will, as Lord Steyn put it, 'carry in the eyes of the public a badge of independence and neutrality; it will be a potent symbol of the allegiance of our country to the rule of law'.
This Government has also been engaged, since 1997, in the reform of the House of Lords, in a broader sense. There may be nothing more important to sustaining a sound political system than the belief amongst citizens that laws are being made by the right people. There is a lot at stake when legislators act. Since 1997, the Government has acknowledged that and pursued reform of the House of Lords.
We moved first to address the presence of hereditary peers. The Government will now legislate to complete that work. Though there is no political consensus on certain aspects of House of Lords reform, it is, I think, clear that a modern democracy should not be compelled to include in its legislature someone who is there purely by virtue of whom they were born to and when.
The changes proposed in the forthcoming House of Lords Bill are necessary to provide stability for the current arrangements. But we need to go further. We need to look for consensus on further reform. The failure to reach agreement on a final house is the history of Lords reform. We should not allow that failure to prevent necessary change. Equally we must recognise that the door to further change is very firmly open, and we must do all we can to persuade people to go through it.
This Government also believes, very strongly, that the final format of the upper house should only be decided after a proper engagement with a wider audience. That is our conception of constitutional affairs. The relationship between citizens and the state will remain at the forefront of reforms pursued by my Department; not only in the substance of those reforms, but in how they are pursued.
Similarly, the credibility and effectiveness of the House of Lords, as a body devoted to the careful scrutiny of legislation, will be enhanced by the formation of a commission for the appointment of Life Peers. This is a massive handover of executive patronage. No longer will the Prime Minster of the day be able to determine the size of the second house or who goes in it.
I will move now to the second of the values that I want to outline tonight: strengthening our democracy and public engagement with decision-making. Our institutions of Government must be credible and effective, but they must also engage the people that they serve. That is a slightly different sort of relationship. It is a relationship to which the Government, since 1997, has paid a great deal of attention. It is a relationship that requires and will receive our continuing attention.
One of the first pieces of work for this Government, on coming to power in 1997, was devolution. Philosophers, historians, constitutional theorists and others were increasingly coming to see the nation-state as being, in some instances, the wrong place for certain sorts of decision-making power. The contribution of the Constitution Unit, and its director, Robert Hazell, on these issues and indeed, on many of the other issues I have raised tonight, has been quite remarkable. The Unit's forthright and powerful research has transformed the nature of public debate about the constitution.
There are two trends emerging in the distribution of decision-making. Sometimes decisions need to be taken beyond the state, because the issues involved or the effects to be created escape the boundaries of the single state. This is why our engagement with Europe is so important. Sometimes, though, the state is too far away. Sometimes the state is not best placed to understand more local circumstances. This was why we legislated to devolve power from Westminster and Whitehall to the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales.
This devolution of decision-making has been successful. The Parliament and Assembly brought their distinctive perspectives to bear in the making of decisions which affect the people of Scotland and Wales. The machinery of Government changes made in June this year serve to demonstrate how well devolution has bedded down. While we continue to think it right that the interests of Scotland and Wales are represented at the Cabinet table, in neither case does this require a full-time Secretary of State. Peter Hain and Alastair Darling have the prime responsibility for ensuring that devolution works effectively for the people of Scotland and Wales. I cooperate closely with them to ensure that the devolution settlements make sense in the context of the United Kingdom as a whole.
Ultimately, making devolution work is not only a matter of high constitutional principle - that part of it was dealt with by the devolution legislation and the debates around that legislation - but it is also a very practical, day-to-day matter for all Government officials, and for all legislators.
Devolution has, undeniably, made some decision-making more complex, but only in the right sorts of ways. Our new multi-layered state requires new skills which Governments within federal or quasi-federal structures have long had to master. The devolution implications of each decision must be considered. If the purpose of devolution is to improve democratic accountability by placing power in the right places, this purpose must be applied to each and every decision. Rolling devolution out across Whitehall, embedding it in decision-making, remains a political priority. I believe that this has begun to happen, that we are responding to the new distribution of powers very well, and that we will continue to improve.
There is still more that we can do to strengthen our democracy and engage the public in the stuff of political decision-making. There are other parts of the UK with strong traditions and identities. There may be other instances in which the centre is not the best place for decisions to be made. This is why the Government will hold referendums next autumn in the three Northern regions of England on whether people in those regions wish to have their own elected regional assemblies.
Our arrangements for democratic governance are strong. We have been improving them since 1997. In some respects, they can still be better.
There is more to the issue, however, of participation. Encouraging an active and informed citizenry is fundamental to the government's thinking. That is why we have introduced citizenship studies into the school curriculum: to help engage the coming generation with political life in its broadest sense as well as to guard against alienation from the democratic political process.
Currently, there are many ways in which people can become involved in decision-making: in this country, you can respond to a Government consultation. In most cases, all this requires is sending an email. You can join a campaign group. You can participate in a rally. You can make representations to your Member of Parliament. You can of course also vote. And my Department is now working to modernise the system of voting.
There may be a certain symbolic significance to walking to your local polling station in order to cast your ballot, the effort is itself arguably part of the process of engagement, but if there are more convenient methods of voting now available, and provided we can ensure that these are sufficiently impervious to fraud, I believe that we should help people to engage with the political process by using those methods.
Part of what excites me in taking forward work on constitutional affairs is the diversity of possible interactions between the state and citizens. And this Government takes the view that the possibilities for engagement and conversation need to be encouraged at all levels; from the parish council to general elections.
Could I turn now to the third of my themes for this evening: increasing trust in public institutions. I think the foundation for trust amongst citizens and public institutions must be good and honest decision-making. People must believe that those who run public institutions place the interests of citizens at the heart of what they do. Typically, people will only believe this when those public institutions do in fact place the interests of people at the heart of what they do. However, even when public institutions do this, there remains scope for misunderstanding. Governance is not always simple, and decisions and their effects cannot always be described in simple terms. Sometimes there will be conflicting descriptions. There is enough scope for that in party politics. Or, sometimes the descriptions will, let's face it, be badly put. One way or another, people do not always accept that public institutions do place the people's interests at the heart of what they do.
I do not think that the way to resolve these conflicts of perspective is to chastise people, or to urge them to learn better. I also think that sometimes it is a good thing for people not to entirely accept what public institutions say or do. Sometimes people should give them a hard time. That is all part and parcel of a modern, sophisticated democracy.
However, whenever trust in public institutions falls below a certain point, problems do arise. People then no longer have any incentive or purpose to engage with political decision-making. A degree of disillusionment can set in. It can become much harder to accept that we, Government and citizen, are engaged in a common endeavour, and the fruits of that endeavour become much harder to realise. But this Government is determined to nurture a sense of civic solidarity and faith in our public bodies.
I believe that there are two aspects to increasing trust in our public institutions.
The first aspect is establishing greater openness.
The party that is seeking trust must be open in its dealings with the other. The other must not feel that it might be taken advantage of, or that it is being shut out. To this end, this Government brought forward Freedom of Information legislation in its first term and this will shortly be implemented in full. This legislation will allow the public to hold public institutions to account. It will let them see that the Government has nothing to hide. It will let the son concerned about the local authority's management of his mother's care home to satisfy himself that the best is being done for her. It will give parents the right to see what plans are being made for the future by the school to which they may send their children.
I think that this will mark an important new phase in the relationship between citizens and Government. I am proud that my Department is responsible for making Freedom of Information a reality. I hope that as people start to use their new rights to access information, it will become harder and harder to believe that government is remote, distant, secretive, or sinister.
The second aspect of enhancing trust in public institutions is assurance. The party that is seeking trust must provide the other with an account of the lines that it will not cross and what the other may do if it does cross those lines.
It is here that the Human Rights Act has particular constitutional significance. Contrary to the fears of some at the time, the Act was never going to produce a litigation fest, for the simple reason that successive governments for the last half century have sought to comply with the ECHR. I will be speaking specificially about human rights in a few days' time. But I can say here tonight that I do believe that the Act does provide important public re-assurance about the standards that public authorities should be working to. It is a fairness guarantee.
Others like the Constitution Unit and you here in this audience will, in time, help provide an assessment of the full effects of our reforms. But I would like to point to one effect in particular - an effect which I believe is already becoming apparent, and is serious, far-reaching and I'm sure irreversible.
Political change can come and go. So can politicians. But there are some things that politicians do which are not alterable, for the simplest but most important of reasons: because the public does not want them to be altered.
I believe that is the case with this key effect of our reforms: handing power back to the people. Pretty well every one of our changes has increased the power of the people at the expense of the power of politicians.
We have, I believe, demonstrated a clear desire and a clear determination to place power where it should be: increasingly, not with the politicians, but with those best fitted in different ways to deploy it. So political decisions about Scotland, for example, are made where they should be - in Scotland. Interest rates are not set by politicians in the Treasury but by the Bank of England. Minimum wages are not determined in the DTI, but by the Low Pay Commission. Membership of the House of Lords will be determined not in Downing Street but in an independent Statutory Appointments Commission.
This goverment will continue to shift power in Britain to where it should be: with the people.
That will be a key theme in the work in which my department is engaged and which we will bring forward to follow the legislation announced in The Queen's Speech.
Robert Hazell once edited a book with the modest title A history of the next ten years. I am a politician and so I am not going to be quite so ambitious. But I do want to describe some of the new issues which we must address over the next ten years if we are to build a stronger democracy.
Political parties are of fundamental importance to the health of our democracy. How do we want them to be funded in future? The Electoral Commission will report on the question next year and I want us to have a mature, informed debate on the way forward.
How do we engage the young in our democracy? The introduction of citizenship education in schools is an excellent innovation. But we must seek other ways of connecting. Is it right that a 16 year old can marry but can't vote? Should we, as I was suggesting in the Observer yesterday, consider lowering the voting age to 16 ?
Over the last 20 years we have completely re-written the statutory framework governing access to information. One of the drivers has been the growing pace of technological change. That pace is quickening. We must keep our information laws under constant review as the form of information changes.
Technology provides us with opportunities which would have been unthinkable just 5 or 10 years ago. One of those is a general election in which citizens have a range of options for casting their vote. Options that take into account lifestyles of the 21st century. We have made good progress in piloting new voting methods locally; we need to decide when we give the public this opportunity at a national election.
Each of these is a big policy choice. We will not shy away from them. But I also want us to think afresh about how we go about constitutional reform. It is clear that my new Department has a role in sustaining the constitution. In reforming the constitution. And in explaining the constitution. But how does its contribution relate to the roles of others, including the role of Parliament? Just as I want our constitution itself to be more transparent, so I want the process of managing the constitution to be clear and readily understood.
I have, I hope, demonstrated that our focus on the constitution is not some passing fad. It is central to our ambitions for Britain. It is central to all that we are doing to build a more cohesive society. A fairer society. A society in which we debate together the big choices we face.
Constitutional reform should not be seen as an issue of exclusive interest to lawyers, academics and politicians. Nor will it do for us to engage in a spasm of reform once in a generation. It is too important for that.
Nor do I want my new Department to appropriate constitutional policy as its exclusive preserve. Quite the contrary. I want us to engage with you and with others in an exchange of ideas and information. An outward-looking Department. A player. Not a remote observer.
To succeed, we must explain our ideas and policies. Consult. Listen. Engage the public in dialogue about the constitution. Not in an academic discourse about august institutions - important though they are. But a dialogue about the values which shape our democracy. And what they mean to people up and down the country.
I have not tried tonight to provide a comprehensive list of everything that we have done, are doing, and will do. What I have tried to do tonight is to provide an overarching view of the values underlying constitutional reform. Credibility. Engagement. Trust. Progressive values that have driven this Government's agenda since 1997 and will continue to guide our approach in the coming years.
In establishing the new Department for Constitutional Affairs, the Government has signalled that it wants to place the relationship between Government and citizens at the heart of everything that it does. And it wants to instil within that relationship the principles of transparency, credibility and effectiveness which Jeremy Bentham thought were fundamental to modern governance.
We have an agenda on constitutional reform - about trust, about credibility and about engagement. It is a tough agenda. A difficult agenda. But I believe it is the right agenda. And it is an agenda I am determined to secure.