| 5.1 |
This chapter develops the discussion in
chapter 1. It is concerned with the civil justice system as a whole
and whether, taking account of the proposed reforms, it provides the
right signals to ensure that problems are dealt with in the appropriate
place and as efficiently as possible. |
| 5.2 |
In a system that was efficiently managed
and gave all the right signals, people would know and understand the
costs, risks and benefits associated with various possible courses of
action. They would be able to make informed decisions about the time,
money and effort that it was worth devoting to resolving a dispute.
As a result, demand and supply in all parts of the system would naturally
find an appropriate and efficient level. |
| 5.3 |
One factor that could prevent the development
of the system in this direction is an over-optimistic view of the resources
that the public sector is likely to provide. Pressure on public expenditure
is intense. If alternative ways of increasing resources receive insufficient
attention, parts of the civil justice system may be starved of resources.
I therefore discuss below the issues of court fees and private forms
of funding legal services. |
| 5.4 |
This analysis suggests several areas on
which future policy might focus. Work on some is already in hand or
planned, but others are new. |
|
The law
|
| 5.5 |
The Government seeks to ensure that the
law itself is as clear and accessible as possible, so that people can
more readily find out and understand what their rights and obligations
under it are. |
| 5.6 |
There are, however, a number of areas where
I believe we should take a step back and ask whether the civil justice
system can produce the results that society expects - such as providing
appropriate compensation and deterring negligent behaviour. Or whether
an alternative approach would be more effective - criminal sanctions,
self-regulation, strict liability for damage caused backed by insurance,
or no-fault compensation. |
| 5.7 |
I am particularly concerned with those areas
where judgements have to be made about whether someone has taken reasonable
care or has acted negligently in all the relevant circumstances of a
case. Making judgements of this kind involves difficult issues about
the risk and predictability of harm, and the degree of risk that an
individual should be expected to bear. These judgements have little
to do with the severity of the event. Harsh consequences can result
from small risks. |
| 5.8 |
I would urge that we should take one of
these areas and conduct a thorough enquiry to see if we can do better.
The area I suggest is medical negligence. I make this suggestion for
three reasons. |
| 5.9 |
First, the subject matter is inherently
difficult to deal with via the legal process. It is difficult - one
might say impossible - to draw a clear line between misfortune and negligence.
Even if one could, it is difficult to accept that those just one side
of the line should receive large sums in compensation and those the
other side should receive nothing. Medicine is shrouded with considerations
of privacy which seem to breed excessive secrecy - a tendency enhanced
by the ever-present fear of legal proceedings. And the scientific evidence
is so obscure over large parts of the field - and the gap between cause
and effect so long in some instances - that precedents and judgements
need to be flexible. |
| 5.10 |
Second, there is a risk that the present
approach increases the costs of medical care through the adoption of
otherwise unnecessary procedures to protect against the risk of civil
suits. |
| 5.11 |
Third, the bulk of the resources deployed
to deal with medical negligence are from the public sector - the health
and legal aid budgets. It makes very little sense to have an increasing
amount of time and money from the health budget extracted in legal fees
rather than patient care, and to engage in a set of arrangements where
legal professionals can earn more from public funds than health professionals.
|
|
The civil justice system as a whole
|
| 5.12 |
I argued in chapter 1 that the civil justice
system goes much wider than the courts, to include advice agencies,
tribunals, and ombudsman schemes, as well as forms of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). The system is fragmented and poorly mapped. Most notably
in the case of tribunals, many separate bodies are responsible for managing
different parts of the system. Within central Government, responsibility
for the related policy issues is often either unclear (ombudsmen) or
split between several departments (tribunals and to some extent advice
agencies). Roles and responsibilities need to be rationalised so that
the system is managed in a cohesive way. I recommend that the Government
should consider bringing responsibility for policy in respect of all
aspects of civil justice under a single roof. The main changes that
this is likely to involve in practice are:
-
re-emphasising the Lord Chancellor's Department's (LCD's) over-arching
policy responsibility for the nature, scope and functions of tribunals,
and possibly transferring the administration of more tribunals
to the Court Service;
-
giving LCD a similar role in respect of policy issues relating
to ombudsman schemes; and
-
transferring responsibility for sponsoring and funding bodies
such as the National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux to
LCD, and giving the department the new role of co-ordinating Government
policy towards the advice sector.
|
| 5.13 |
Meanwhile, a major priority for LCD should
be to improve the quality of the management information that is available
about the civil justice system, and the development of an IT strategy
to deploy it. Lack of information is the biggest single obstacle to
developing civil justice to meet changing circumstances. |
| 5.14 |
In terms of services, particular importance
should be attached to the provision of basic information to the public
about:
-
what their legal rights and obligations are(1);
-
the legal system generally; and
-
the various services available to help resolve disputes and the
advantages and disadvantages of each.
|
| 5.15 |
The Government should continue to encourage
and facilitate the development of all forms of ADR. In saying this,
I am not asserting that ADR is necessarily better or more cost-effective
than litigation. I am anxious that it should not just become an additional
element of cost, particularly where it is recommended by the court.
But ADR increases the range of options to settle disputes, and the Government
should seek to remove obstacles to its development generally, as well
as funding ADR in appropriate cases through legal aid. If ADR became
more widespread, it would also help to increase competition in the market
for legal services generally - a theme to which I return below. |
| 5.16 |
Consideration should also be given to whether
there is a role for an independent advisory body to promote and co-ordinate
the development of ADR at a national level, and to address common issues
such as standards and accreditation. |
|
Public interest cases
|
| 5.17 |
Paragraph 1.3
explained that I have taken the resolution of private disputes to be
the primary role of the civil justice system. Many of my conclusions
reflect this emphasis. However, there is likely to be a small number
of cases for which these conclusions are not sufficient. I have in mind
cases that are relatively complex and expensive compared to the immediate
benefits involved, so that an individual party would rarely choose to
pursue them, but where a clear and specific wider benefit, such as an
important precedent, is likely to be produced. |
| 5.18 |
Under the existing civil justice proposals,
I would expect test cases of this sort to be heard on the multi track.
But the nature and significance of these cases is very different from
those that are on the multi track because they simply involve a large
amount of money. This has led me to wonder whether, in the longer term,
a fourth track would be appropriate for test cases. Or alternatively
whether the multi track should eventually be reserved for test cases,
and the fast track approach extended and adapted to cover other large
cases. Either way, there may also be a case for saying that in cases
involving novel and complex points of law, litigants should not generally
be permitted to represent themselves (see also endnote 8, paragraph
2.47). |
| 5.19 |
The criteria that would justify the taxpayer
subsidising the cost of court and legal services in these cases are
also different - especially if litigants cannot represent themselves.
I am therefore attracted by the idea that there should be a separate
system for funding cases that met a clearly defined public interest
test(2). Such a fund might be managed by the Legal Aid Board, but should
be kept clearly distinct from legal aid itself, i.e. the system for
supporting the cases of less well-off people generally. |
|
Court services
|
•
|
Funding |
| 5.20 |
In 1996-97, the total cost of the civil
courts was £325 million. Income from fees and other receipts was £268
million or 82% of the cost. Fee remissions and exemptions were worth
over £8 million. So if court fees had been payable in every case, £276
million or about 85% of the cost would have been recouped. In other
words, the average level at which fees are set leaves some £49 million
to be found by the taxpayer. Furthermore, the legal aid scheme spent
an estimated £50 million on court fees - the largest single component
of a total subsidy from the taxpayer of about £107 million (33%). |
| 5.21 |
One of the most important signals in any
system is price. If prices do not fully reflect costs, it is not possible
for users to make sound choices about the appropriate way to pursue
their problem. I therefore consider it important that the Government
should achieve its stated policy of setting court fees at a level that
reflects the cost of the services provided by the civil courts. |
| 5.22 |
There is no justification for setting fees
generally at levels that do not reflect cost, so that litigants benefit
equally regardless of means. Any subsidy that the taxpayer does provide
should be explicit and targeted on those who could not otherwise afford
access to the courts. I would increase fees to reflect the full cost
of the courts, and add a sum equal to the additional fee-income generated
to the legal aid budget. |
| 5.23 |
Legal aid is the best mechanism for ensuring
that public funds are targeted on those who most need help. In future,
a more flexible legal aid system could subsidise the cost of court fees
in cases where it was not appropriate to meet the cost of legal representation
(see paragraph 3.6). It could then replace
the existing system of fee remissions and automatic exemptions. The
new approach would be more transparent, easier to administer, and subject
to an appropriate merits test. It would also mean that the fees paid
by legal aid in successful cases could be recovered from the opponent.
|
| 5.24 |
It is equally important that individual
fees should reflect the cost of the particular processes to which they
relate. At present, there is a substantial degree of cross-subsidy both
between different areas of court business and between different stages
of cases - most fees are paid when cases are issued, but a high proportion
of the cost relates to trials. Consequently, the finances of the courts
are vulnerable to changes in the volume or pattern of their workload.
The Lord Chancellor intends to issue a consultation paper about the
future structure of fees in the autumn. I hope that one of his objectives
will be to eliminate cross-subsidy between different areas of business
and substantially to reduce the degree of cross- subsidy between stages.
|
| 5.25 |
This overall approach to court fees offers
one further advantage. The civil courts would effectively be self-funding.
Their income would reflect the demand for their services, and they would
be in a stronger position to manage their costs to reflect that income.
This would make it possible to consider giving the Court Service greater
freedom to manage its own resources. The way to do this would be to
set up a trading fund for the civil courts. This would free them in
large measure from public expenditure constraints. |
|
Accommodation
|
| 5.26 |
The civil justice reforms are concerned
with efficient court procedures. The other major area where I believe
there to be substantial scope for improving efficiency is accommodation.
The physical estate of the existing court system seems to be severely
under-utilised; at the same time, the courts themselves are poorly equipped.
There are currently nearly 250 county courts, many of them very small.
The cost of maintaining this infrastructure is substantial. The problem
is not just the cost of the buildings. More staff are required to keep
these small units running than would be needed if the work was concentrated
in fewer places, and that in turn generates a higher management overhead.
The overall result is that a remarkably high proportion of the cost
of the civil courts is effectively fixed, making it difficult to manage
the system flexibly or respond to changes in workload. |
| 5.27 |
The majority of cases do not require a trial.
Going to court is usually a once- in-a-lifetime experience. I see no
reason why people should not generally be expected to travel some distance
if they have to do so(3). I therefore recommend that the Court Service
should be required to draw up a plan to reduce substantially the number
of civil courts, perhaps to about the number of Crown Court centres.
I return to the question of the services that ought to be available
at a more local level in paragraphs 5.29-30. |
|
Tribunals
|
| 5.28 |
Tribunals are essentially courts with a
specialised jurisdiction (see paragraph C.10).
They were originally intended to operate procedures that were relatively
simple and non-legalistic. But in many tribunals the rules, procedures
and practices are virtually indistinguishable from those found in the
higher courts. I believe that the time is now right for a comprehensive
programme of reviews of the various major tribunals. Taking account
of their different business requirements, these should consider how
far the procedures of each tribunal could be simplified, and whether
some tribunals should charge fees or introduce a cost-shifting rule
(see paragraphs 5.20-25 and 5.45). |
|
Legal services
|
•
|
A Community Legal Service |
| 5.29 |
Chapter 3 considered the existing set of
proposals for reforming the legal aid system. However, the Government
is also committed to the establishment of a Community Legal Service.
The election manifesto said, "A community legal service will develop
local, regional and national plans for the development of legal aid
according to the needs and priorities of regions and areas. The key
to success will be to promote a partnership between the voluntary sector,
the legal profession and the Legal Aid Board." My terms of reference
ask me to consider how far relevant aspects of the reform programmes
might be developed to lay the foundations for a Community Legal Service.
|
| 5.30 |
I have not, in the time available, been
able to consider this idea in the depth it deserves. But the essential
features of a Community Legal Service are that it:
I would see it as part of a deliberate shift away from expensive court-based
litigation services towards a much greater emphasis on information services,
non- lawyer advice and assistance, and alternative dispute resolution.
|
| 5.31 |
The current legal aid proposals are already
pointing in the right direction. Subject to some re-focusing, I believe
that the foundations for a Community Legal Service are implicit in the
existing programme of reform. The Legal Aid Board should therefore be
charged with adapting its plans and managing the change to a Community
Legal Service (see paragraph 4.22). |
| 5.32 |
The starting-point will be the establishment
of the new Regional Legal Services Committees. The role envisaged for
them is central to the creation of a more locally-responsive service.
Briefly, that role will be:
-
to gather information and views in order to assess local needs
and priorities in the legal aid field;
-
to act as a mechanism for partnership between the various bodies
involved in providing legal services;
-
to gather information about the availability and spread of different
types of legal service in an area, and to promote the development
locally of new services such as ADR(4); and
-
to advise the Board, when it lets contracts for legally-aided services,
on the optimum balance between geographic access, choice and value
for money (see paragraph 3.35).
|
| 5.33 |
In the longer term, I would see the centrepiece
of the Community Legal Service as a network of small local offices,
providing basic information and diagnostic advice. These offices might
be co-located with advice agencies or based on the premises of county
or magistrates' courts, council offices or libraries. They would advise
people with a potential legal problem about alternative ways of dealing
with it and the services - both private and legally-aided - that could
help. I do not see this information service as being restricted by a
means test to those who are eligible for legal aid. |
| 5.34 |
I argued in paragraph
3.21 that an element of service provision by directly employed staff
can provide a useful benchmark. The information service described above
might be a good place to try out this option first. |
| 5.35 |
I see the establishment of genuinely local
information services, combined with the greater emphasis on advice and
assistance, as a counterpoint to the reduced emphasis on litigation
and courts. It is important that these two developments are co-ordinated.
In future, it is likely that there will be fewer firms contracted to
provide legally-aided litigation services and fewer county courts (see
paragraph 5.27). In so far as these are both currently significant sources
of basic practical information, it is important that something should
replace them. More specifically, the network of Community Legal Service
offices could be linked electronically with the court system. While
it is reasonable to expect people to travel some distance if they are
involved in a trial, the same is not true for procedural or interlocutory
hearings, which may be very short. The answer must lie in information
and communications technology. |
| 5.36 |
As I have said, all this is implicit in
existing plans. But there will also need to be some changes of emphasis.
I wish to draw attention to two issues:
|
| 5.37 |
The existing proposals place considerable
emphasis on national priorities and the sub-delegation of central budgets
to the regions according to a formula. The aim is to ensure that the
level of service available is broadly consistent across the country
as a whole. That is a reasonable objective. But it leaves only marginal
scope to adjust the allocation of resources to reflect local priorities.
The concept of a Community Legal Service implies a larger element of
local decision-making. And so less consistency. The Government will
need to decide how far down that road it wishes to go. |
| 5.38 |
Second, the existing proposals assume that
responsibility for assessing the merits of cases will gradually be delegated
from the Legal Aid Board to the contracted providers themselves. I have
already expressed some concern about this (see paragraph
3.32), arguing that the Legal Aid Board should for the time being
retain responsibility for conducting the merits test. The drawback is
that this involves an application on paper to a remote office, which
takes time and means that the person conducting the test has no direct
knowledge of the case or contact with the applicant. |
| 5.39 |
The network described in paragraph 5.33
might provide a better basis for organising the assessment of merits
and possibly also means. These offices would be able to conduct the
tests in the course of giving face-to-face diagnostic advice. They would
then be able to refer the successful applicant to an appropriate service
provider (or offer them a choice of contracted providers). But they
would not themselves provide the further services, and so would not
have a financial interest in the outcome of the application. |
|
The market for legal services
|
| 5.40 |
The concept of a Community Legal Service
goes wider than helping those in the community who need direct financial
support from the taxpayer. This section therefore discusses the market
for legal services. It is important to ensure that this market operates
effectively, so that people who do not qualify for legal aid are able
to obtain the legal services they need at competitive prices. And of
course the legal aid scheme has to buy its services in that wider market.
|
| 5.41 |
There seem to be two main defects with the
market at present:
-
It is subject to a complex patchwork of regulations. Like all
regulation, the intention is to protect the consumers. But the
effect is as likely to be to protect the interests of providers
and to prevent competition and innovation.
-
There is a marked imbalance in the knowledge and information
available to individual one-off purchasers and professional providers.
This makes it difficult for people to seek the most appropriate
service and the best value for money.
|
| 5.42 |
I would therefore seek to remove restrictions
on the way that lawyers can charge for their services. Any that remain
should be subject to a tough national interest test. This would help
to stimulate a more competitive market, widen access to justice generally
and, in some cases, offer an alternative to publicly- funded legal aid.
I discuss some of the options in more detail below. |
| 5.43 |
I would also seek to ensure, through the
Community Legal Service, that information is made readily available
about the legal services available in a locality and what they might
cost. Further, building on Lord
Woolf's recommendations 59 and 60, I would require solicitors to
make written agreements with their clients at the start of every case,
setting out what the price of the case (or perhaps for each stage of
the case) will be, the circumstances in which the price(s) might need
to be varied, how such variations would be calculated, and the prospects
of success. I have already argued that in fast track cases solicitors
should agree a fixed price, and that those prices should be published
(see paragraph 2.45). |
| 5.44 |
The above proposals should go some way to
redress the imbalance between one-off purchasers and professional providers.
Organisations that buy legal services in bulk are in a much stronger
position, and legal aid is the biggest bulk purchaser of all. Future
developments in legal aid, therefore, should be planned with an eye
to their likely impact on the wider market. Specifically,
-
the Legal Aid Board's quality assurance system could be developed
as a more general kite mark. The Community Legal Service could
publish information about franchised firms so that consumers would
know that they operated robust office systems and were considered
competent in certain fields. This might in turn help to stimulate
the wider development of quality assurance and accreditation schemes
by the legal profession itself.
-
I have already said that legal aid contracts should avoid hourly
rates in most cases in favour of fixed prices and arrangements
that make the provider take a share of the risk ( paragraph
3.19). As well as obtaining better value for money for legal
aid, I hope that this would help to accustom lawyers to devising
alternative ways of charging for their services, which they could
offer more widely.
|
| 5.45 |
Any consideration of the market for litigation
services is complicated by the rule that costs generally follow the
event. This inevitably requires a regulatory system - currently taxation
by the courts - to determine an appropriate amount for the unsuccessful
party to pay in respect of his or her opponent's costs. But so long
as that system depends on an after-the-event assessment at an hourly
rate decided by the court, the scope for competition and more efficient
price structures to develop is severely limited. I recommend that the
costs rule itself and the mechanisms for determining costs awards should
be reviewed to see if they can be made to fit better with fixed prices
and other forms of remuneration that are not based on hourly rates.
I would also want to consider whether the rule should be introduced
in some tribunals (see paragraph 5.28). |
|
Alternatives to legal aid
|
•
|
Conditional Fees |
| 5.46 |
Since 1995, solicitors and their clients
have been allowed to make conditional fee agreements in limited areas
of work(5). Although the results of the research into this experiment
have not yet been published, there seems to be a widespread consensus
that conditional fees have worked well and achieved their primary purpose
of improving access to justice for those who do not qualify for legal
aid. It seems to me that the value of conditional fee agreements has
now been sufficiently well established. Their scope should therefore
be widened to embrace all civil proceedings (although in practice, of
course, they are mainly relevant where a money claim is involved). |
| 5.47 |
I argued in paragraph 5.3 that an over-reliance
on public funding may act as a constraint on the resources devoted to
civil justice. It follows that I do not believe that legal aid should
be available for cases that could be pursued satisfactorily under some
form of private funding, such as a conditional fee agreement. The existing
law prevents the Legal Aid Board from taking account of the possibility
of a conditional fee agreement when considering applications for legal
aid. I understand why this was thought appropriate during the initial
experiment, but I believe that the time is now right to remove this
restriction. |
| 5.48 |
One approach would be simply to remove those
areas of work for which conditional fee agreements are most suitable
(e.g. most personal injury work) from the scope of the legal aid scheme.
In practice, however, it would prove difficult to define the appropriate
categories, and within any definition there could conceivably be cases
that ought to be pursued but whose individual circumstances made them
unsuitable for a conditional fee. My preferred approach, therefore,
would be to allow the Legal Aid Board to consider, as part of the merits
test for granting legal aid, whether a case was suitable for funding
by some form of private arrangement. This would be consistent with the
existing approach in cases where people have access to alternative sources
of support such as a Trade Union. |
| 5.49 |
Conditional fees have the great advantage
that some of the risk is taken by those who assess it. This is likely
cause advisors to concentrate on the quality of their judgement of the
outcome. So I believe that conditional fees should take precedence over
legal aid wherever practicable. In future, I would expect most monetary
claims, including the vast majority of those suitable for the fast track,
to be funded privately rather than by legal aid. And I see no difficulty
in moving from legal aid to conditional fees or vice versa if the changing
nature of a case justifies it. |
•
|
Contingency fees |
| 5.50 |
I also think that the time is now ripe to
reconsider whether contingency fees - where the fee is a proportion
of the amount recovered rather than an uplift to the normal bill - should
also be permitted. There is no essential difference in principle between
conditional and contingency fees. Indeed, in some ways the latter may
be preferable. Contingency fees create an incentive to achieve the best
possible result for the client, not just a simple win. And they reward
a cost-effective approach in a way that conditional fees, where the
lawyers' remuneration is still based on an hourly bill, do not. Opponents
of contingency fees usually cite the experience of them in the United
States of America. However, considering the differences between the
two jurisdictions - notably the cost-shifting rule and the fact that
juries here do not generally set damages - we should re-assess whether
those concerns may be misplaced. |
•
|
Legal expenses insurance |
| 5.51 |
Legal expenses insurance is potentially
a valuable means of widening access to justice. Although free-standing
policies have not proved successful, legal expenses insurance, in the
form of cheap but limited add-on policies to car or house insurance,
is probably more widespread in this country than is generally believed(6).
|
| 5.52 |
Two factors seem to limit the wider growth
of this market. One is that most people do not expect to become involved
in litigation and therefore do not see the need for this type of insurance.
That is essentially a marketing problem for the insurers. The other
is the high and uncertain cost of litigation discussed in this report.
I would not favour the tax breaks that are sometimes proposed to stimulate
demand. I would, however, favour removing any unnecessary restrictions(7).
|
| 5.53 |
As large-scale purchasers of legal services,
insurers should be able to use techniques such as fixed price contracts
to put downward pressure on costs, in much the same way that it is proposed
the Legal Aid Board should. It is also conceivable that the Board might
wish to operate in partnership with one or more insurance companies,
jointly contracting to purchase legal services on behalf of legally-aided
people and policy holders respectively. |
•
|
A Contingency Legal Aid Fund |
| 5.54 |
Another idea that has been put to me is
that of a Contingency Legal Aid Fund. This would work much as legal
aid does at the moment, but with the additional element that successful
litigants supported by the fund would pay a surcharge out of their damages.
Depending on the success rate of the cases applying to and accepted
by the scheme, and on the amount of the surcharge, such a fund could
become self-financing. |
| 5.55 |
This is a different approach to managing
the risks inherent in litigation. The essence of a CLAF is that the
cost of unsuccessful cases is spread between successful litigants. Under
the present legal aid scheme, on the other hand, that cost (and the
cost of funding cases in progress) is borne by the taxpayer; while under
conditional or contingency fees, lawyers carry much of the risk. |
| 5.56 |
My preference would be to emphasise the
development of conditional fees, because they put the risk on those
best able to manage it. But the possibility of establishing a CLAF is
definitely worth exploring. It might be particularly appropriate for
very expensive cases where it was not practicable for even a large firm
to bear the amount of risk involved(8). |
|
Conclusions
|
| 5.57 |
My principal recommendation is that a single
Government department should be responsible for all aspects of the civil
justice system. This department should be charged with improving management
information, developing an IT strategy for the whole system, and facilitating
the development of alternative forms of dispute resolution. The Government
should also continue to place emphasis on ensuring that the civil law
itself is clear and accessible. More specifically:
-
there should be separate arrangements for funding cases that
raise issues of wider public interest (paragraph 5.19);
-
court fees should be set at a level that reflects the cost of
court services, with cross-subsidy between different fees kept
to the minimum practically achievable (paragraphs 5.21-25);
-
the Court Service should be required to draw up a Plan to reduce
substantially the number of civil courts (paragraph 5.27);
-
a Community Legal Service should be built on the existing plans
for Regional Legal Services Committees, and should then develop
a local network of outlets for basic information and diagnostic
advice (paragraphs 5.32-33);
-
franchising and contracting should be developed with a view to
the wider market for legal services on which they can have a significant,
beneficial impact (paragraph 5.44);
-
conditional fee arrangements should become available for all
civil proceedings. The case for contingency fees should be reconsidered.
Legal aid should not be granted in cases where there is a suitable
alternative form of funding (paragraphs 5.46-47 & 5.50); and
-
there may also be a place for a CLAF for some types of case
(paragraph 5.56).
|
| 5.58 |
I also recommend a small number of reviews
which go with the grain of the reforms set out in my report. None of
them would delay the implementation of the reforms. They are:
-
an immediate examination of the possible advantages of no-fault
schemes and strict liability, starting with medical negligence
(paragraph 5.8);
-
a rapid investigation of the rule that costs follow the event
(including its possible application to some tribunals) and the
mechanisms for determining costs awards (paragraph 5.45 & 5.28);
-
a review of the restrictions that currently apply to legal expenses
insurance (paragraph 5.52); and
-
a programme of reviews of tribunal procedures and fee-charging
policies (paragraph 5.28).
|
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