The Transfer of Warrant Execution Project was created to transfer responsibility for execution of a range of warrants from the police to the Magistrates Courts Committees by 1 April 2001. The police had to balance execution of warrants against other priorities, and the Government believed the system would be more effective and efficient if Magistrates' Courts Committees (MCCs) took over lead responsibility for this work.
Increasing demands on police resources and pressure for MCCs to improve enforcement had driven a search for other methods to secure the payment of fines. MCCs were making extensive use of private bailiffs to execute distress warrants, and both police forces and MCCs were using civilian enforcement officers (CEOs) to execute warrants of arrest.
Practice in warrant execution varied across the country, depending on the approach taken and resources available to the police and MCCs in each local area. The level of fines and costs written off also varied between areas, reflecting different management approaches, geographic, and socio-economic conditions in each.
The Government took the opportunity of the Access to Justice Act 1999 to put civilian enforcement on a proper statutory footing. The legislative changes enabled the transfer by:
Giving CEOs and private enforcement agencies employed by the courts powers to execute warrants anywhere in England and Wales (rather than just in the area of the authority that employs them, as previously);
Extending the range of warrants that civilians may execute (for the first time they can execute arrest warrants for breaches of community penalties);
Enabling warrants to be executed by CEOs, or private enforcement agencies, or the police, without the warrant having to specify which;
Subject to safeguards, enabling civilians to execute warrants without having to have them in their possession at the time;
Clarifying the circumstances in which a warrant for the enforcement of a sum adjudged to be paid will cease to have effect;
Enabling the Courts to check whether other Government agencies hold a more recent address for 'missing' fine defaulters and those in breach of community penalties.
The Transfer of Warrant Execution Project commenced in March 2000 and was overseen by a project board comprising the main stakeholders to the transfer. The transfer took place on 1st April 2001 and the project was reviewed six months after implementation. This report sets out the findings of that review.
Recommendation 1 (para 4.4)
LCD to consider how existing guidance (including guidance on enforcement issued by the Enforcement of Financial Penalties Working Group) might be revised and updated to include examples of good practice, drawing on MCCs' experience to date, and following consideration of the Home Office research report.
Recommendation 2 (para 5.3)
LCD to provide contact list for MCCs showing strategies employed.
Contact list issued to JCEs on 16 November 2001.
Recommendation 3 (para 5.3)
LCD to host a further series of enforcement conferences in Spring 2002, the aim being to bring together enforcement practitioners to consider the lessons learned from experience of the transfer; to share good practice, and to participate in the discussion and development of further measures to improve enforcement.
Planning currently underway for conferences in April 2002.
Recommendation 4 (para 6.1)
LCD to seek to agree with the National Probation Service and other stakeholders a national protocol on sharing information for risk assessments to supplement the NFA, based on successful models currently in operation.
The National Probation Service is working on a model form to provide available information, for use nationally.
Recommendation 5 (para 6.2)
LCD to discuss with Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) the establishment of a national policy for access to, and exchange of, information held by the police, including arrangements for updating police records.
Working party comprising key stakeholders established 19 December with target date of March 2002 for submitting application to PITO.
Recommendation 6 (para 6.3)
LCD to work with the Justices' Clerks Society to develop proposals on out of area arrests.
JCS has consulted members by means of a questionnaire.
Recommendation 7 (para 6.4) LCD to pursue the possibility of replacing the existing paper-based information sharing system with DWP with an IT-based solution.
Recommendation 8 (para 6.4)
LCD to review the need for collection of the present range of statistics on information sharing once future funding of the DWP operation has been secured.
Letter to JCEs on 18 December asked MCCs to continue to collect statistics until the end of the current financial year, when the position would be reviewed.
Recommendation 9 (para 6.5)
LCD to await Government response to Auld before developing future policy on the enforcement of local tax warrants.
Recommendation 10 (para 6.7)
LCD to consider the question of market testing in 2003.
Recommendation 11 (para 7.1)
To develop a netting off scheme for introduction across England and Wales in April 2002.
The Treasury has approved a trial netting off scheme to commence in April 2002. MCCs bids for funds were approved in December 2001.
Recommendation 12 (para 7.2)
LCD to consider the need for civilian enforcement staff to be given powers of search, entry and restraint.
Recommendation 13 (para 7.2)
LCD to clarify policy on the use of handcuffs.
Recommendation 14 (para 7.3)
LCD to pursue with other government agencies the possibility of widening the current information sharing arrangements.
Recommendation 15 (para 7.3)
LCD to consider possible changes to primary legislation to enable a wider range of information to be provided to the courts.
Recommendation 16 (para 7.4)
LCD to consider the need for more radical changes to the present enforcement regime, once the current programme of work has been completed.
This report has been produced to record the findings of the Post-Implementation Review of the transfer of warrant execution project, conducted during September and October 2001. The purpose of the Review was to find out:
whether the expected benefits of the transfer have been achieved;
whether there have been any unexpected benefits;
whether there have been any unexpected problems;
the reaction of the users of the new system, i.e. Magistrates' Courts Committees and other stakeholders (including the Prisoner Escort and Custody Services (PECS), National Probation Service, Police, Youth Justice Board (YJB) and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)); and
to make recommendations on the actions required to resolve problems identified in the report and to make further improvements to the system.
The Transfer of Warrant Execution Project was created to transfer responsibility for execution of a range of warrants from the police to Magistrates' Courts Committees in England and Wales.
The objectives of the project were to:
Ensure that every MCC had arrangements in place for the execution of warrants of arrest, commitment, detention and distress issued in connection with any sum adjudged to be paid, and warrants of arrest issued in connection with breaches of a range of community penalties;
Ensure that the revised arrangements had the potential to deliver higher levels of fine enforcement and compliance with community penalties than were previously being achieved;
Bring into force the clarified and extended powers of CEOs, including improved access to records held by other agencies.
Mindful of the independence of MCCs, LCD did not dictate what strategy they should adopt in response to the transfer or how they should set about implementing it. The role of the Project team was to create the necessary framework within which MCCs could work, to facilitate change and collaborate with MCCs to ensure that they had the necessary tools to implement their chosen strategy.
Over a period from October 2000 to April 2001 the project produced a number of products and outcomes, comprising:
Secondary legislation; including the Approval of Enforcement Agencies Regulations 2000, the Enforcement of Warrants (Disclosure of Information Order 2000) and other statutory instruments to enable relevant sections of the Access to Justice Act 1999;
A National Framework Document setting out inter-agency arrangements for warrant execution;
A protocol for sharing of information on missing defaulters between the MCCs and the DSS (now DWP);
A series of practitioner conferences in January/February 2001, designed to communicate the goals and objectives of the project to all MCCs and to stimulate the exchange of good practice between them;
Help and support for MCCs preparing for the transfer of responsibility, including targeted consultancy support during February and March 2001;
Guidance notes for MCCs;
Closedown and Follow on Actions reports, issued in May 2001.
This review was planned for six months after the date of transfer, when benefits and problems could be clearly identified.
In December 2000 the LCD project team asked every MCC to complete a self assessment of their readiness for the transfer by rating their capability to undertake warrant execution against a five-point scale, as follows:
The assessment was, by its nature, subjective, though guidance was given on the criteria used to assess capability. The team also identified two measures of the capability of MCCs to carry out warrant execution. These were:
warrant execution capability (December 2000) including warrants executed by the police, MCCs and local authorities;
capability (in December 2000) under the control of the MCC (i.e. the capability which would remain when the contributions of police and local authorities that were not continuing beyond April 2001 were removed).
These two measures illustrated the existing level of service and the level that would exist if the MCC made no further progress.
Data describing the position of each MCC were then combined with information on the strategy being pursued for the transfer. This permitted analysis of progress and capability by strategy. This information provided the starting point for the Post Implementation Review.
Data to inform the review were collected from several sources. Statistics on information sharing, local tax warrants and debt were analysed. In addition, a questionnaire, approved by AJCE/CCMCC, was sent to all Justices' Chief Executives (JCEs) seeking an assessment of current capability for warrant execution and feedback on the various aspects of the transfer:
JCEs were asked to grade their assessment of each aspect using a given scale, and to provide detailed comments where appropriate.
A programme of visits, covering nine MCCs selected to provide a representative cross section of the 42 MCCs in terms of enforcement strategy and geographical location, was carried out during September and October 2001. Each visit took the form of a structured interview, along the lines of the questionnaire, with the Justices' Chief Executive (or their representative) and staff involved in enforcement and warrant execution. The list of MCCs visited is at Annex A. Information obtained from these meetings was collated with the questionnaire responses received from MCCs.
A number of other stakeholders were also asked to assess the transfer project from their perspective. These included PECS, National Probation Service, Metropolitan Police Service, Association of Chief Police Officers, the Youth Justice Board, the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux and DWP.
The enforcement team is grateful to all those who took the time and trouble to provide the information on which this Report is based, and in particular to those MCCs which participated in the structured interviews.
When asked in December 2000 to assess their capability for warrant execution, 64% of MCCs stated that their capability was acceptable (i.e. met the majority of requirements) or higher. 23% noted a partial capability (i.e. with some shortfalls). 13% claimed only limited capability (i.e. scoring 2 or less). These ratings represented a significant improvement on the position at the beginning of the year, as demonstrated in the table below.
| 3 months before transfer - January 2001 | 6 months after transfer - September 2001 | |
| Acceptable or fully meets /exceeds requirements | 36% | 64% |
| Partial capability | 26% | 23% |
| Limited capability | 38% | 13% |
The number of MCCs showing an acceptable level of performance in September 2001 is lower than 100% because the scores reflect the fact that not all MCCs commenced execution of the complete range of warrants from April. Some MCCs made arrangements with local police forces to continue to execute breach warrants for a period, until the MCC's arrangements for the transfer were in place. In Merseyside, for example, police were continuing to execute breach warrants until the end of October.
Almost half (44%) of MCCs employ CEOs for warrant execution. Two MCCs (Essex and Warwickshire) have contracted all warrant execution (both fines and community penalties) back to the police. 15% are contracting all the work to an Approved Enforcement Agency and 39% are employing a mixed strategy, either employing CEOs and an AEA or CEOs and police.
There is little correlation between the level of capability reported and the strategy employed by the MCC. Those MCCs which established a transfer project team early in the transfer project, and those with previous experience of employing CEOs, ranked themselves more highly in terms of capability than those MCCs without previous experience of employing CEOs, or which, for whatever reason, began planning for the transfer rather late in the process. Even so, there were exceptions to this general rule - for example, North Yorkshire noted that it had intended to contract the work to an AEA but due to difficulties over TUPE transfer arrangements, changed strategy and appointed CEOs in mid-May. Despite those difficulties, the MCC rated its capability in September 2001 as fully meeting or exceeding requirements.
MCCs' views of the effectiveness of the new system
Half of the respondents considered the new regime to be effective or very effective. 39% considered that it was adequate, but were confident that in the future enforcement would be effective once the new arrangements settled in. Humberside reported that the average time for warrant execution had reduced significantly: from 140 days for the police to 50 days for in-house CEOs. Another commented on its improved success rates and a decrease in write off rates since appointing an AEA. Four MCCs thought it was still too early to make an assessment.
Only four MCCs thought the system ineffective; all had opted to use an AEA for either some or all of the work. Some AEAs were experiencing recruitment problems. One MCC was concerned about the quality of the training provided by the AEA.
Despite earlier concerns, no MCC reported problems with youth warrants, although in some areas agreements have been reached with the police to continue execution of youth and breach warrants until the courts were ready to take them on. Training provided by Police, Probation and Youth Offending Teams in some MCC areas was considered helpful and may have allayed previous fears.
Over half (56%) of respondents felt that there were no unexpected problems associated with the transfer. Where unexpected difficulties arose, they fell into five main areas: access to risk information, access to PNC, out of area arrests, resources for information sharing and local tax warrants. These are discussed in Chapter 6 below.
Individual MCCs also noted problems specific to their area. These included:
Backlog of unexecuted warrants
The project team established that there was a significant backlog of warrants held by the police and LCD sought assistance from the Home Office to ensure that this was not transferred to MCCs in April 2001. Despite these efforts, MCCs inherited approximately 106,000 warrants in total from the police, though there were significant variations between areas in the numbers and types received. Two MCCs withdrew old breach warrants (more than 12 months). Some warrants were re-issued and others were written off. One MCC reported the backlog delayed execution of new warrants whilst another concentrated its efforts on new warrants. One MCC reported the warrants returned by police caused more problems than just addition to volume, as they did not agree with court records.
Around a third of MCCs reported being badly affected by the backlog. The remaining MCCs were either not affected because they did not inherit any backlog due to prior arrangements with the police, or because old warrants were written off.
Impact of the work on other areas of the criminal justice system
Prior to implementation there were fears that the transfer policy could have a significant negative impact on other areas of the criminal justice system. In some cases the anticipated problems failed to materialise. For example, there had been concerns that the police would be inundated with requests for assistance with arrests, which would, in effect, render the transfer pointless. The review demonstrated that police involvement has been kept to a minimum, with a third of MCCs reporting that they have never sought police assistance and only two MCCs (Greater London and West Midlands) requesting police assistance on more than 20 occasions. This was acknowledged in the responses from the police (Metropolitan Police and ACPO). While the number of requests may increase as more MCCs take on responsibility for executing breach warrants, the number of cases where police assistance is requested is likely to remain a tiny proportion of all warrants executed. Two MCCs expressed fears that police co-operation in providing assistance might decline in future, if requests were made too often. They also mentioned a slow response from police on occasions, but understood that they might have more urgent priorities.
Similarly, PECS had expressed fears about a surge in prisoner numbers, but to date these have proved to be groundless. The position will continue to be monitored.
One MCC commented that the information sharing scheme with DWP had resulted in more offenders being brought before the courts. This had resource implications, as they did not have sufficient court clerks to hold courts - on one day they reported that 140 defaulters had attended the court. Another commented "At times the courts have difficulties in dealing with the volume of defendants that the AEAs bring before the court".
Capability of Approved Enforcement Agencies
The ability of the private sector to rise to the challenge immediately (from April 2001) appeared to present difficulties for those MCCs choosing to contract out the work to an AEA. These included:
AEA redeployed experienced staff from the MCC area to work in other areas covered by the same contract, leading to a dip in performance.
a high turnover of staff in the AEA leading to a lack of continuity.
failure to provide information in respect of enforcement officers at the start of the contract.
delay in providing the MCC with details of arrangements made with other public authorities.
AEA not returning warrants to the MCC within the timescale specified in the contract.
delay by the AEA in organising the execution of community penalty orders.
Performance of LCD project team
MCCs were invited to say what could have been done better by the LCD project team. 21 MCCs (50%) expressed disappointment with two aspects of the team's performance. They considered that specific elements of the project (NFA, legislation, guidance and conferences) should have been completed earlier in the process, and that there was an unacceptable delay in finalising the funding arrangements:
"LCD could have started the transfer process earlier especially the roadshows." (Durham)
"Northumbria was not as prepared as they had hoped on the 1st April 2001 due to the tardiness by LCD to confirm fundamental issues relating to the transfer."
"The Project team was set up later in the roll out than it should have been but once it was implemented it was extremely effective" (Bedfordshire).
"Set out funding for more than one year - to enable longer term planning" (Cumbria)
"Guidance and funding details came too late. Council tax warrants should not have been made the responsibility of MCCs without appropriate funding" (Lancashire)
Of particular concern was the scope of the project. The LCD project team's remit was to enable the transfer of work from the police to Magistrates' Courts Committees. From the outset, the range of warrants included youth, community penalty and local tax warrants. However, in response to concerns raised during the project by AJCE/CCMCC at the inclusion of these warrants in the first designation order, LCD agreed to investigate the possibility of postponing their transfer and including them in a subsequent designation order. Despite intensive negotiations, this proved impossible, and the question was not resolved until mid-December 2000. MCCs were consulted on the proposed legislation in September 2000 but final versions of this and the NFA were issued later than planned. MCCs did, however, have sight of previous drafts and were able to initiate local discussions and preparation on a provisional basis. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the uncertainty caused by these delays impacted adversely on MCC's ability to plan for the transfer.
A fuller discussion of the lessons learnt during the project may be found in Chapter 4 of the Project Closedown Report (attached at Annex B [pdf]), which was issued to MCCs in May 2001.
The question of future funding for enforcement is covered in Chapter 7 below.
Comments received from stakeholders (National Probation Service, Prisoner Escort Custody Services, ACPO, Metropolitan Police, Youth Justice Board and NACAB) were generally favourable or neutral.
The National Probation Service reported that it was difficult to provide a clear overview of the effect of the transfer as several areas had either not yet commenced execution of community penalty warrants, or had done so only recently. However their view by the end of September was that execution of these warrants was not yet working satisfactorily The overall position was very mixed. Seven Probation areas were critical of the service they received from MCCs (London, Greater Manchester, Humberside, Northumbria, Surrey, Kent and Derbyshire) and seven (Staffordshire, Lancashire, West Mercia, Durham, Cheshire, Leicester, Thames Valley) were positive about the effects of the transfer, with the remainder expressing neutral views. In some areas this work had been contracted back to the police and the service offered ranged from good to poor.
ACPO reported that the transfer was considered successful overall; it was encouraged by feedback from individual police forces which showed arrangements were working well across the country: e.g. "From Staffordshire's point of view, the transfer has been highly successful.". ACPO considered there were a number of minor issues outstanding and proposed solutions. These included developing "cross-organisational liaison panels to address any problems (Devon and Cornwall protocol is particularly useful here)", providing access to PNC for court staff; courts "to proactively target "regular" defaulters".
Several benefits were planned to flow from the Transfer of Warrant Execution project, and the review revealed that all of them were realised to some degree. While the LCD project team can claim some credit for providing the framework, it is clear that the transfer would not have been achieved without the hard work of enforcement staff within individual MCCs, and the detailed planning, negotiation and implementation that took place at local level. The benefits are discussed more fully below.
Clarity on the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders
The National Framework Agreement (NFA) set out the minimum level for arrangements for warrant execution that were agreed between LCD and the Home Office. The purpose of the document was to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various parties who may become involved in the process of warrant execution. It was produced under the supervision of the Transfer of Warrant Execution Project Board, which included representatives of the various stakeholders (Association of Chief Police Officers, the Metropolitan Police Service, the Central Council of Magistrates' Courts Committees, the Association of Justices' Chief Executives, the Justices' Clerks Society, Prisoner Escort and Custody Services, the Association of Chief Officers of Probation and the Youth Justice Board) and approved by Ministers.
The review revealed that expectations that roles and responsibilities would be clarified had been largely met. 77% of MCCs reported that the NFA was working well, with a further 9% expressing the view it was working very well. Just 14% felt that it was not working well or at all. They reported concerns that other agencies had not promulgated the agreement to their staff at a local level. Whilst most of these problems have been resolved, in some areas local police or probation staff still appear to be unaware of the status of the NFA. Unresolved issues generally resulted from difficulties in relationships with local agencies, rather than problems arising from the NFA itself. One MCC reported that the local PECS contractor had received contradictory advice so local staff were confused. Others said local protocols needed to complement the NFA were not yet in place.
However, there was widespread agreement that the NFA has helped resolve a number of long-standing disputes between agencies (e.g. problems over differing interpretations of the arrangements for taking prisoners into custody). Encouragingly, 92% of MCCs reported that other CJS agencies were adhering to the agreement either completely or well. Neither the Youth Justice Board nor PECS reported any specific concerns on the operation of the NFA, although they would continue to monitor the position.
Foundations for detailed local agreements between Criminal Justice agencies
It was also expected that the NFA would provide the foundations for MCCs to develop more detailed local agreements with other agencies. Although the question was not asked explicitly, over half of all MCCs reported they had developed, or were in the process of developing, service level agreements or protocols with other agencies locally.
Co-operation and sharing of information by stakeholders
A further anticipated benefit was greater co-operation and sharing of information between local agencies. 51% of respondents to the questionnaire considered there had been an improvement in relationships with other agencies since the transfer, with the remainder reporting no change. Questionnaire respondents were generally positive about the sharing of information on risk between criminal justice agencies, with 68% reporting that information was shared frequently or often. Comments were mixed, but it was clear that MCCs saw the provision of information on risk as a priority and were keen to work with other agencies to establish proper systems. The National Probation Service reported that most areas considered there were good systems in place for sharing information, though particular difficulty was reported in one MCC area. Issues arising are discussed in Chapter 6.
No significant problems have been reported in the legislation that was enacted to facilitate the transfer (Sections 92-97 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and associated secondary legislation), although one MCC (which may have been articulating a more widespread view) reserved judgement until the new arrangements had been tested over a longer period.
This suggests, at least provisionally, that a balance has been struck between those elements which have been enacted as primary legislation, those which are covered in secondary legislation and, in the case of the Approval of Enforcement Agencies Regulations 2000, those matters which are to be resolved through the negotiation of contracts.
That said, around half of respondents mentioned areas where additional legislation, going beyond the scope of the original transfer project, was thought desirable. These areas are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
Better tracing of fine defaulters and those in breach of community penalties
The information-sharing scheme with the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) was introduced following a pilot study in four courts, conducted under that part of the Government's Crime Reduction Programme dealing with the Enforcement of Financial Penalties. Full results from the pilot courts will be published in 2002. However, the initial findings were sufficiently encouraging to justify early introduction of a national scheme. A protocol, setting out the arrangements by which courts could request basic information about fine defaulters and those in breach of community penalties from DWP was agreed and implemented at the time of the transfer.
DWP received 81,526 requests for information from the courts in the six months to the end of September, of which 98% had been cleared. The percentage of new information provided remained consistent throughout: 34% of the requests had produced a new address for the defaulter, 26% a 'different address' (i.e. where the address provided by the court was not held by DWP, but DWP were able to provide the address of a person with matching details living in the same area), 1% revealed 'other details' were held (eg the defaulter was deceased), 26% showed that DWP and MCC details matched and 13% confirmed that there was no trace of the person in DWP records.
Based on the information available to the end of September (not all MCCs using the scheme have provided full statistical returns), recovery rates were running at around 15% of the total amount written off in the same period. £138,150 was collected following successfully executed warrants and £949,657 was written off for the period April to September 2001. The total amount of fines recovered following use of the scheme, which would otherwise have been written off, exceeded the DWP administration costs after 7 months of operation.
The information sharing scheme may also be realising positive but unquantifiable benefits. If public perception that defaulters will be tracked down is increased, then confidence in the criminal justice system is raised, and the likelihood of future default is reduced.
Administration of the scheme
MCCs welcomed the scheme; 32% expressed the view that the scheme was very successful in tracing defaulters, and 55% thought it was good. Where an MCC thought the scheme was not successful in tracing defaulters, it was generally because addresses provided matched existing court records, or the information from DWP had not led to the defaulter being arrested. However, some MCCs reported that they had achieved results by revisiting addresses where DWP confirmed the address matched the details held by the court, rather than automatically writing off the fine as irrecoverable. 90% of those MCCs using the scheme confirmed the administrative arrangements were working well, or very well. Only one MCC did not have arrangements in place for using the scheme.
MCCs were pleased with the turnaround time for receipt of information from DWP and commented that the information sharing scheme was far more successful than they had predicted. While DWP was largely satisfied with the arrangements for operating the scheme, it reported two complaints made by members of the public to the courts. These arose from MCCs pursuing individuals who were not defaulters, as a result of information provided by DWP under the 'different address' category. While the protocol states that any information provided under this category should be treated with caution, these complaints are being taken seriously, and the usefulness of this category of information is now under review.
Outside the review, several MCCs reported that they were running out of the forms used to request information from DWP. Enquiries revealed that there had been a problem with the initial distribution of forms by the DWP printers. LCD has now made arrangements with DWP to resolve this.
Guidance
LCD supplied all MCCs with guidance notes on the transfer of responsibility for warrant execution in March 2001. These were intended to help enforcement staff in magistrates' courts to understand their new enforcement responsibilities as set out in the Access to Justice Act 1999 and associated secondary legislation.
The guidance notes were well received with an overwhelming majority, 95%, reporting that the guidance was useful or very useful, though several MCCs qualified their praise by noting that the notes should have been issued earlier. One MCC said it would have been helpful if the guidance had contained a 'model' ID card, certificate of authorisation, and bail form, and another said that a model contract for employing an Approved Enforcement Agency (AEA) would have been useful.
Training
A series of enforcement conferences was organised in January/February 2001 to support MCCs in planning for the transfer. These were well received and there was clear interest in further such events aimed at sharing best practice. In addition, LCD provided consultancy support to individual MCCs who were experiencing local difficulties. MCCs said that both conferences and consultancy support were beneficial but commented on the timeliness of this support (see Chapter 3).
LCD had neither the skills nor the resources to offer support to MCCs in training CEOs. A number of MCCs had employed CEOs for many years and were able to use their expertise in developing and extending training for new staff. Those MCCs without previous experience were encouraged to seek assistance from other MCCs who had relevant experience. MCCs commented favourably upon the support provided by other agencies including the Police, YOTs and Probation Service to run in-house training courses. 14 MCCs found the training provided by their local police force very useful and two mentioned that the input from the probation service had been very helpful. Some MCCs bought in specialist training, e.g. in dealing with volatile situations. Role-play of real life scenarios, job shadowing, and training in safe driving, race awareness and equal opportunity issues were considered valuable. In the West Midlands a court legal advisor had provided training on Human Rights.
90% of MCCs were confident or very confident that their staff had been provided with the necessary training. One MCC was arranging for local Youth Offending Teams and Probation to provide training for CEOs working alone, and on dealing with members of the opposite sex. Derbyshire said its AEA had commented that training provided by West Yorkshire police was excellent. 4 MCCs (Derbyshire, Durham, Thames Valley and West Yorkshire) were concerned that staff had not been trained adequately. Of these, three were concerned about training of AEA staff. One said that lack of proper training resulted in a high turnover of AEA staff.
Most respondents reported that training for their CEOs had covered all the areas listed on the questionnaire (enforcement process, local procedures, dealing with difficult customers, powers of CEOs, Human Rights, health and safety, use of equipment, breach warrants, risk assessment). Some MCCs did not include first aid as part of health and safety training and listed that as a gap in training. Other topics which MCCs considered useful, or essential, were: race and disability awareness, self-defence/break-away techniques, equal opportunity, aggression awareness, restraint techniques, IT skills, debt counselling, the inner workings of the magistrates' courts, and drug awareness.
It has been proposed that LCD should draw together examples of good practice that have been developed since the transfer, to provide information on approaches that have been tested in the field.
Recommendation: LCD to consider how existing guidance (including guidance on enforcement issued the Enforcement of Financial Penalties Working Group) might be revised and updated to include examples of good practice drawing on MCCs' experience to date, and following consideration of the Home Office research reportThe decision to transfer responsibility for warrant execution from the police to the Magistrates' courts was in part a response to the low priority afforded by the police to warrant execution, and in part a move to enable MCCs to control the whole enforcement process. Responses from MCCs indicate that benefits in both areas have been realised.
Interviews with MCC staff showed that MCCs had seized the opportunity to re-engineer their approach to enforcement and to target limited resources more effectively. They were generally more confident that realistic targets could be met now that they had control of the whole process. Surrey noted that staff confidence over the control of warrants had increased and Bedfordshire said "better training facilities have enabled us to feel more confident that write-offs are genuinely "no trace"". Cheshire noted that it was possible to have "more effective management of the enforcement function if MCC controls the process".
Aside from the benefits that were expected to accrue from the Transfer of Warrant Execution Project, 41% of MCCs reported that additional benefits have been realised, largely through the efforts of enforcement staff within MCCs. These have been observed in areas of performance, communication and control.
An objective of the transfer project was to ensure the new system had the potential to deliver higher levels of fine enforcement and compliance with community penalties than was achieved under the previous regime. The transfer project was seen as an enabler - providing MCCs with a foundation for performance improvement over a period of time. It was anticipated that there might be a dip in performance whilst the new system bedded in, but that real improvements would begin to be demonstrated towards the end of the first year. However, in some MCCs improved performance has already been shown through an increase in the number of fines warrants executed.
Half of MCCs considered that warrants were being actioned more promptly than before, though 5 MCCs reported the opposite. Those reporting slower execution were all using AEAs to execute warrants. In one case, the MCC reported the AEA had moved experienced staff to set up operations in a neighbouring MCC area. Two MCCs reported the AEA was experiencing recruitment problems but considered that the decline in efficiency was only temporary. Surrey reported that fine warrants were being executed more quickly since the transfer but breach warrants were not. Humberside noted "Better co-operation and communication between defendants and CEOs". Manchester reported, "CEOs feel that following the transfer defendants are more responsive. It has been noted that defendants perhaps now realise that following the non-compliance with an Order, that they will be arrested expeditiously".
In discussion, MCCs reported increased team spirit amongst those involved in the transfer project, whilst others had been impressed by the way in which their CEOs had risen to the challenge. North Yorkshire commented "CEO team working efficiently/effectively in a short space of time, despite inexperience". Two MCCs noted that staff transferring from the police initially experienced some difficulty in their new roles as part of the MCC's enforcement team. Any such difficulties have been largely overcome due to the efforts made by MCCs in providing induction and training for new staff. GLMCA mentioned that CEOs had been motivated by internal project team visits and a regular newsletter had had positive feedback. It also reported "extra discretionary effort from Warrant Office staff as a result of a clear understanding of their value within GLMCA". One MCC, employing an AEA, was very satisfied with the performance of its own staff but had concerns about the "canteen culture" which existed amongst AEA staff. Leicestershire commented "Producing results. Staff feel empowered".
Support provided to MCCs by other criminal justice agencies in respect of training has already been discussed in Chapter 4. At the regional conferences MCCs expressed their desire to share good practice. In discussion with CEOs during the visits, CEOs themselves indicated that they should have been involved in decision-making nationally and their expertise should have been used in other MCC areas for training. While the conferences held in January /February 2001 were directed mainly at JCEs and enforcement managers in advance of the transfer, conferences planned for 2002 should be able to draw on good practice and previous experience to a greater degree. Several MCCs asked LCD to circulate a list of the strategies adopted by all MCCs, with contact points, so that they could make direct contact with their counterparts in order to discuss good practice.
Recommendations:
In managing the transfer of warrant execution project, the LCD project team identified a large number of issues and risks to the project. These were monitored and eliminated or mitigated wherever possible. Some of the expected problems did not materialise, while in some cases a need for further work on particularly difficult issues has been identified. It is testament to the commitment and resourcefulness of MCCs and other agencies that where anticipated difficulties did arise, these were reduced or overcome and the transfer was successfully effected.
Remaining issues to be resolved fell into five main areas:
These are discussed below.
The NFA made it clear that it was vital for the arresting officer to have as much information as possible before executing the warrant. Crucial to this would be the sharing of information at a local level, subject to legal and security considerations, with the police, probation service and YOTs.
However, MCCs varied in their approach to negotiation with other agencies and, as a result, protocols and agreements were not in place in some areas from April 2001. The review revealed that the picture across the country continues to be mixed. 25 MCCs have an agreement with at least one of the main stakeholders (PECS, Probation and police), whilst 10 MCCs have an agreement with all three. One MCC reported that "the Probation Service are not providing risk assessments with each warrant as agreed and do not give sufficient information on addresses for the defendants, ie No Fixed Abode" another reported a similar reluctance by Probation and YOT officers to provide risk assessments. Conversely, one MCC commented that "Probation provided full risk assessment and Group 4 were brilliant."
While many MCCs have noted their determination to pursue and resolve these problems, MCCs should do more to foster liaison but be aware that agencies will provide relevant information only. It is for the CEO or AEA to undertake the actual risk assessment. To assist, work is in hand to provide a model form for Probation to use to provide available information.
Recommendation: LCD to seek to agree with the National Probation Service and other stakeholders a national protocol on sharing information for risk assessments to supplement the NFA, based on successful models currently in operation
Prior to the transfer, the police expressed concern about the reliability and quality of information held on PNC and were reluctant to consider requests for access. It was evident that access to the PNC was patchy, with only 32% of respondents reporting any kind of access. In some access was still under negotiation. 25% of MCCs were satisfied with information obtained through police contacts.
The National Framework Agreement stated that "local arrangements will determine which fines and community sentence breach warrants are circulated on the Police National Computer."
However, the question of access to information held by the police (whether or not that information is actually held on the PNC) remains a big issue for MCCs. It was clear from the visits undertaken by the LCD team that MCCs presently rely on a range of contacts with the police, both formal and informal. This has led to variations in approach across the country, with the flow of information being dependent on the strength of the relationship with the local police.
Many MCCs have told us that it would be helpful to have a clear national policy, agreed with the police, about what information may be disclosed, wherever it is stored in police records.
In addition, the question of what constitutes access to PNC remains unresolved. No MCC currently has direct access to the PNC by means of a terminal in a court. Some MCCs have developed arrangements whereby the police will provide information on a list of cases by fax or phone. Arrangements for updating information are similarly ad hoc, and carry with them resource implications for the police and for MCCs.
This is of particular concern where breach warrants are involved, and there would be clear advantages for MCCs if all breach warrants were automatically circulated on the PNC.
Recommendation: LCD to discuss with Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) the establishment of a national policy for access to, and exchange of information held by the police, including arrangements for updating police records. [Working party comprising key stakeholders established 19 December with target date of March 2002 for submitting application to PITO]
6 MCCs thought that arrangements set out in the NFA for out of area arrests for breach warrants were inadequate and thought LCD should have provided a firmer steer on these. MCCs are reluctant to pay for CEOs or AEA staff to travel significant distances to transport an offender arrested on a breach warrant to the MCC which holds the papers. It has been suggested that it would be more cost-effective to transfer paperwork rather than people (as is presently the case with fines warrants), but primary legislation would be needed to enable a breach case to be transferred to another court. Even if the legislation were amended, there would continue to be a cost to the criminal justice system, as Probation Officers would need to travel to the MCCs hearing the breach.
In February the Justices' Clerks Society (JCS) undertook to examine how these arrangements might be improved, but considered the numbers to be insignificant. At the request of Enforcement Branch, JCS have undertaken to investigate the extent of the problem and report to LCD.
Recommendation: LCD to work with JCS to develop proposals on out of area arrests.
While MCCs acknowledged the benefits of the information sharing scheme with DWP, almost half raised concerns about the administrative effort required, both in using the paper-based system and in collecting the statistics required by LCD.
The LCD project team was aware that the paper-based system would be resource intensive, but the system needed to prove its worth before any commitment could be made to investing in an IT based solution. This will now be pursued with DWP.
The additional burden of collecting statistical information for performance monitoring was of great concern to administrative staff, and was frequently raised during the visits to MCCs. While recognising the extra work involved, performance monitoring in its present form will need to continue until funding of the DWP end of the operation is secured. Once this has been achieved, LCD will review the need for monitoring in its present form.
A number of MCCs have included extra resources for information sharing in their business cases supporting bids for netting off money. Assuming the netting off scheme is implemented as planned, this should ease the burden on administrative staff.
Recommendations:
There remains an issue over the inclusion of local tax warrants in the transfer. In most areas, the majority of this work is not directed to the courts, but where local authorities do not carry out the work themselves, it presents a significant burden for the MCCs.
13 MCCs are executing warrants for one or more of the local authorities in their area. The extent of this work presents a problem for Staffordshire, Warwickshire and West Mercia, but is a significant burden for West Midlands MCC, where all local tax warrants are directed to the courts.
It is clearly not a satisfactory position for responsibility for warrant execution to lie with different agencies in different parts of the country. However, the Auld review of the Criminal Courts was published during the Post Implementation Review. Recommendation 151 states that:
"Preparatory work should be undertaken with a view to the removal, in due course, of all civil debt enforcement from courts exercising a criminal jurisdiction.".
The Government is considering its response to the Auld review and we shall need to give further consideration to this issue, in conjunction with DTLR, in light of the Government's response to the Auld review.
Recommendation: LCD to await Government response to Auld before developing future policy on the enforcement of local tax warrants.
Enforcement targets were not set for the first year following the transfer as no baseline data were available and MCCs do not yet share a common IT system to support performance monitoring. The current performance indicator for financial warrants gives the proportion of the amount imposed that is recovered - expressed as the payment rate.
Views and suggestions were sought in the questionnaire on sensible targets for the coming financial year. MCCs were clear that they should receive adequate funding to be able to meet any targets set and that they "should not be set up to fail".
Analysis of statistics from the first two quarters since the transfer showed that nationally, fine enforcement rates have been maintained by MCCs following the transfer. Payment and cancellation rates are within the range of previous results. However, we expect that MCCs should be able to achieve performance improvement following further experience with the new arrangements. It should also be stimulated by exchange of good practice between MCCs and by increased investment and support for improvement of enforcement.
All MCCs were asked to collect data on breach warrants in order to establish a baseline for setting targets for 2002/03. 32 MCCs (76%) provided useable data and the results showed there was room for substantial improvement in performance. Although 64% of youth bail warrants and 51% of adult bail warrants have been executed or withdrawn, the percentage of adult bail warrants executed within 28 days of issue, and the percentage of youth bail warrants executed within 14 days of issue, were both significantly lower. The position for both categories was worse for no-bail warrants. However, with greater experience, MCCs should be able to improve performance in this area.
Challenging targets will be set for 2002/03 to ensure that enforcement receives a high priority within individual MCCs.
An outstanding issue from the transfer project remains cost effectiveness of chosen strategies and future market testing. At the time of the transfer it was confirmed that market testing was not mandatory for MCCs. LCD considered it to be more important to get the new enforcement regime up and running by April 2001, and that judgments about the benefits of the various methods of organising enforcement could be made when the enforcement landscape looked more settled. After only six months in operation we consider that it is too early to form a view on the efficiency and effectiveness of the various strategies adopted. We are aware that some MCCs have already begun to address this issue, by using both in-house CEOs and an AEA and monitoring the inputs and outcomes.
Recommendation: LCD to consider the question of market testing in 2003.
MCCs were asked for views on the remaining barriers to successful enforcement and what further changes might be needed. Some of these are already being addressed as part of the Enforcement Programme; others will need to be included in the plan. Many will need primary legislation and are therefore measures for introduction in the longer term.
MCCs considered there had been an unacceptable delay in finalising the funding allocation for 2001/02. However, LCD had confirmed at an early stage that MCCs should plan for enforcement on the basis that their allocation would be similar to that received in 2000/01. In addition, 21 respondents identified insufficient funding as one of the main barriers to successful enforcement, commenting on lack of funds to implement initiatives and increase resources, both in terms of staff and equipment, including warrant tracking software and vehicles. Another general concern was the lack of adequate IT systems in all MCCs. The remainder considered that they had sufficient funds, although one MCC qualified its reply, citing, for example, local tax warrants as being an unwelcome burden. Concerns were raised about the method of grant allocation as well as the lack of certainty over enforcement funding in future years.
LCD has addressed these concerns by developing a 'netting off' scheme, which will enable MCCs to recycle a proportion of the income from fines for improving enforcement. The Treasury has approved proposals for a two-year trial netting off scheme, to commence in April 2002, covering the enforcement of both financial and non-financial orders. Local tax warrants are excluded from the scheme. MCCs were asked to produce business cases for additional funds that would be provided through a netting-off scheme, including the cost of the current level of enforcement activity; the performance to be achieved; the cost of any additional activity to improve performance, and the improvements in performance to be realised. This information formed the basis for allocating funds; bids were approved in December 2001.
Recommendation: To develop the netting off scheme for introduction across England and Wales in April 2002. [A trial netting off scheme has been approved by Treasury for commencement in April 2002]
The most frequently raised area of concern was the perceived need for more explicit powers for civilians charged with executing warrants - specifically, powers of search, entry to property and powers to restrain offenders.
The enforcement regime that was implemented on 1 April 2001 was predicated on the decision that the Government does not want to see the routine use of force by civilians making arrests, and a concern that it would be inappropriate to give civilians quasi-police powers which, if exercised, would make it more rather than less likely that violence would ensue. However, Ministers have made it clear that the question of civilian powers would be revisited in the light of experience as part of the post-implementation review of the transfer policy.
48% of MCCs expressed a need for further powers. Respondents were less clear about the scale of the problems to be addressed, and none was able to provide figures on the number of occasions that particular additional powers would have been necessary to effect an arrest. That said, discussions revealed a strong desire for powers which would enable enforcement staff to tackle difficult cases, and which in turn might lead to a general realisation among defaulters that existing loopholes were being closed.
Power to Search
10 MCCs expressed concern that enforcement staff had been given no statutory powers to search offenders on arrest. They argued that the lack of such powers exposed them to unacceptable risks when it came to detaining or transporting prisoners. They considered that existing LCD guidance was sound as far as it went, but it did not cover the circumstance where, for example, an offender who initially agreed to come quietly becomes violent at some point after their arrest, perhaps in transit. Similar concerns have been raised by ACPO and CCMCC.
In discussion, MCCs suggested that the mere knowledge that a legal power to search existed could go a long way to convincing offenders that it is in their interests to co-operate. Other respondents took this further, arguing that forcible search powers should be granted on the basis that they would rarely need to be used - the mere threat of a forcible search would be sufficient. On the face of it, then, there would appear to be a case for a statutory power of search on which CEOs might rely when on the doorstep. However, a number of potential difficulties were noted, including the precise nature of any search powers, how to deal with any weapons, or any other materials (eg drugs/stolen goods) that are found and the possible risks to CEOs in carrying out a search.
Power to Enter Property
During visits to MCCs, a number of CEOs expressed their frustration that having tracked down an offender they were unable to execute the warrant because they were refused admission to the property. Common complaints were that someone would open the door at the address where the offender was known to be residing and deny that he was at home, when there was clear evidence to the contrary. Some CEOs even reported seeing the offender waving to them from a window, safe in the knowledge that the CEO had no power to enter. The extent of any new power would need careful consideration, particularly in respect of existing police powers of entry to property and would need to be in accordance with the HRA. Health and safety concerns would also be paramount.
Powers of Restraint
Closely allied to discussion of powers of search and entry is the question of powers of restraint. Some MCCs were keen to see powers of restraint, where unavoidable, in facilitating an arrest. Others wanted explicit powers to restrain prisoners in transit, should the need arise. While MCCs recognised the health and safety risks associated with the use of force to make an arrest, and generally accepted that this was police work, a few requested clarification of policy on the use of handcuffs. Some MCCs (and AEAs) noted they used handcuffs or 'speedcuffs' to restrain prisoners while in transit. Others have trained their staff in the use of handcuffs, but have not so far had occasion to use them. Again the extent of any new power would need careful consideration, including what ought to happen if the offender withdrew consent while in transit.
Recommendations:
While acknowledging the success of the information sharing scheme with DWP, MCCs noted that insufficient information about offenders continued to be one of the biggest barriers to improving enforcement.
MCCs were keen to see the current arrangements extended to Inland Revenue, DVLA and local authority housing associations. GLMCA had secured agreement with DVLA for the exchange of information, though the system was not operational at the time of the review. An extension of the present scheme could be achieved (subject to agreement with other government agencies) under current legislation. This is being pursued as part of the LCD's Enforcement Programme.
As a refinement to the current arrangements, it was suggested that allowing the courts to establish whether a defaulter is in receipt of benefits and the address to which the payment is being made, or allowing the courts to access information about a defaulter's employer would make it easier to trace the defaulter and, if appropriate, to make deductions from benefits or attachment of earnings orders. Further dividends might be gained by DWP if court enforcement staff were to report possible fraud to DWP where the claimant was found not to be living at the address to which benefits were being paid. Such an extension to the information sharing powers would require primary legislation. LCD has, however, notified the Performance and Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office of these proposals, so that they might be included in a forthcoming report on Information Sharing across government.
Recommendations:
Two MCCs suggested that a radical overhaul of the present enforcement regime was needed, arguing that the courts should be given enforcement powers similar to those available to local authorities and the Child Support Agency, where defaulters are only required to return to court if committal is necessary. It was thought that this would alleviate pressure on the courts, in terms of listing and hearings, both reducing costs and enabling a more efficient enforcement process. Another MCC noted there should be a greater range of sentencing options. Three MCCs suggested that a national agency for enforcement should be considered.
These suggestions go far wider than the current programme of work on enforcement. Any wholesale review would need to take account of the recommendations of the Auld and Halliday reports, and be compatible with work on civil enforcement that is being taken forward following the Green Paper, Towards Effective Enforcement.
Recommendation: LCD to consider the need for radical changes to the present enforcement regime once the current programme of work has been completed.
Responsibility for warrant execution has been transferred to Magistrates' Courts Committees successfully. MCCs themselves shouldered a large part of the burden in taking forward the work in local areas and in many cases the success of their operations is due to the time and commitment of MCC staff in taking forward local projects.
The objectives of the project have been met and expected benefits are beginning to accrue. Despite a few teething problems, the legislative framework and negotiated roles and responsibilities do support the management of warrant execution by MCCs.
The potential for improvement in performance has been borne out in early gains in several MCCs and positive assessments of capability in the majority of cases.
The project has had a beneficial effect on morale and on inter-agency and inter-MCC co-operation. The conditions are good for delivery of improvements, provided that MCCs are given the infrastructure, support and resources required for enforcement. The report demonstrates that LCD is addressing these issues and that MCCs themselves are engaged in the process of negotiation and liaison with other agencies.
A number of barriers to improved performance have also been identified. These include systemic constraints that may require legislative action. LCD has noted the issues and will include these in a future programme of work for enforcement.
The review team recommends that, subject to receiving Ministerial approval for further work on enforcement, a programme of work should be designed to address the specific recommendations set out in this report. The Criminal Enforcement Programme Board should oversee this work, which should be taken forward in liaison with colleagues working on reform of civil enforcement, following the publication of the Green Paper, Towards Effective Enforcement, as well as the various stakeholders identified elsewhere in this report.
| MCC | Strategy | Date of visit |
|---|---|---|
| Surrey | Contracted out | 5 September 2001 |
| Wiltshire | In-house CEOs | 7 September 2001 |
| Cambridgeshire | Contracted out | 11 September 2001 |
| GLMCA | TUPE of police CEOs | 13 September 2001 |
| West Mercia | Contracted out | 19 September 2001 |
| South Yorkshire | In-house CEOs | 20 September 2001 |
| Humberside | In-house CEOs | 24 September 2001 |
| Hertfordshire | Contracted out | 27 September 2001 |
| West Midlands | TUPE of police CEOs | 1 October 2001 |