Although this case is interesting on its own facts, it is noted as a reminder of the pitfalls of procedural law in adoption and how even experienced adoption agencies can get it wrong. Here the mother's right to the return of a child voluntarily placed for adoption ceased under Section 27 when the adoption application is made and not (as the agency thought) when the mother gives her formal consent to the reporting officer.

An order freeing a child for adoption was not in itself outside the provisions of Article 8. In this case, on the facts (unremarkable in themselves: them other was a chronic alcoholic), the E.Ct.H.R. held that the order fell within Article 8(2) and there was no breach. Given that there was no breach, the court declined to entertain a claim under Article 13 of no adequate remedy.

A local authority, having obtained a freeing order, concluded that an adoptive placement could not be made and wished to have the order revoked. There is no right in anyone to apply for such an order except a parent after 12 months. It was a proper use of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to make the other sought.

Section 34 contains no power in the court to prevent the local authority making such provision for contact as it thinks in the child's interests. The jurisdiction may be used to enlarge on the local authority's plans but not to prohibit them - Section 34(2) does not contain any such power.

In upholding the decision of Wall J (noted at PP 99/32 in this series) the Court of Appeal say that the only general question this case decides is that male circumcision should be treated as a further exception to Section 2(7) and should not be carried out without either the consent of all who hold parental responsibility or a Specific Issue Order.

The question about who should be given permission to intervene in care proceedings where allegations have been made is one to be considered on the facts of each individual case. Here the court refused leave to a 17 year old girl accused by her parents of making dishonest allegations of sexual abuse against her father and encouraging her younger sister (the subject of the proceedings) to do the same; however, the court added that the mere fact that she was an alleged victim rather than perpetrator would not of itself disqualify her from such permission.

There is a vital distinction between therapeutic work and a forensic investigation by an expert. The two must not be confused. Generally it is not right for a forensic report to be prepared by an expert also engaged in therapeutic work with that child.

Here the court considers the difficult issue of disclosure to a professional (or other body) of a diagnosis in relation to a parent rendering them unfit to care for a child where that parent's employment (here as a nurse) gives rise to questions of protecting the public. Perhaps the main point in this case is that this matter requires consideration whenever such a diagnosis (eg severe personality disorder) is made.

Where a child is voluntarily accommodated in a children's home, a local authority had no power to move the child to a foster home where those who have parental responsibility objected, even if the child's welfare so required. In such circumstances the local authority would have to apply for a care order.

Removal of a child at birth and restrictions of contact amounted to a breach of Article 8. This case merits reading as showing the scrutiny to which the court will subject a decision and a discussion on the Margin of Appreciation.

This case contains an exhaustive examination of the law in relation to disclosure and privilege in care proceedings and in particular the application of the decision of the House of Lords in Re L (A MINOR) (POLICE INVESTIGATION: PRIVILEDGE) [1997] 1 FLR 731 (Leading Case 96/3 in this series). Her the GAL wanted access to the identity and work of experts instructed by the father only in relation to criminal proceedings involving one or three children the subject of the care proceedings. The judge concluded:-

• the father could claim legal professional privilege in respect of his (direct and indirect) communications with, and the reports of, the medical experts he instructed solely for the purposes of the criminal proceedings; and
  
  
• on that basis (and thus so long as he has not waived the privilege) the father had an absolute right to refuse to disclose such communications and reports in the care proceedings.

It follows, of course, that the father neither had applied for disclosure of papers in the care proceedings nor sought to use the evidence in those proceedings.

In this case Bracewell J offers guidance in respect of the maintenance and review of social work files and records in cases of longstanding concerns and, in particular, parental non-co-operation.

Section 34 is ECHR complaint. Wall J warns against the routine parading of ECHR points in Children Act cases.

Where parties foresaw the need for a split hearing in which allegations were to be made against a non-party, it was essential for early consideration to be given to the need to invite that non-party to seek permission to intervene. This was to avoid the twin evils of either a late adjournment or an appearance of unfairness (and thus a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR) to a non-party given insufficient time to prepare.

Here Bracewell J offers guidance to local authorities faced with very young pregnant women and urges clear advance planning with an eye as much to the unborn child as to that of the mother. Such cases should usually be heard in the High Court with appointment of GAL for mother and child.

In this case the Court of Appeal hold that they have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a 'causation' or 'finding of fact' part of a split hearing even though no formal order is sought to be challenged. They also offer a reminder to judges of the need to have, and spell out, cogent reasons for not accepting expert evidence.

Whilst the court often invite foreign courts to make minor orders in transnational cases, there were potential difficulties in reciprocating under the Children Act because of the residence requirements to found jurisdiction. However, such jurisdiction could be found but should only be exercised by judges of the Family Division.

Although a court has power to refuse to make an order under Section 4 even where both parents agree, it has no jurisdiction to prevent parents entering into a parental responsibility agreement even where the child was in care and that course was opposed by the local authority, just as, of course, it could not prevent the father acquiring parental responsibility if he subsequently married the mother (see p 520 G-H).

Because there may be a huge range of differing commitment from unmarried fathers to a child, there was an objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment between married and unmarried fathers with regard to the AUTOMATIC acquisition of parental responsibility under the Children Act.

Although not decided under the Children Act, this case has potential importance for carers of seriously disabled children. Here the court, in the aftermath of the death of a child who had received very large damages for medical negligence at birth, holds that it had jurisdiction to hear an application by the child's mother for 'reasonable provision' out of the child's estate pursuant to the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

Where a mother, who alone had parental responsibility, refused her consent to allow blood samples to be taken from a child notwithstanding a direction for blood tests under Part III of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, the court had no power to compel her consent or circumvent her refusal; the only remedy was the drawing of an adverse inference. In so deciding Wall J urged legislative reform, doubted that Part III was ECHR compliant but declined to follow the route found by Hale J (as she then was) in RE R (BLOOD TEST: CONSTRAINT) [1998] 1 FLR 745 (PP 98/7 in this series).

This case is noted to illustrate the problems that can arise from the conflict between order to disclose and solicitor-client confidentiality. Any such orders must be restricted in both extent and time as is compatible with the need to trace a child.

This case illustrates in a remarkable way the informal means that courts may utilise in dealing with the welfare of children - here telephone conversations with Californian judges. The key thing is that the parties were at all times kept informed and their consents obtained.

All solicitors are aware of the risks of conflicts of interest in family proceedings eg where their firm may have represented another party in earlier but unrelated criminal proceedings. The court will only intervene where there would be a 'real risk of disclosure of confidential information'. However, solicitors are advised to run computer checks not only when instructions are accepted but whenever subsequently a party is added.