A reminder - if one were needed - that a local authority reporting to its adoption panel should include the views of the GAL or, if no such view has yet been formed, that fact.

This is a further case in which the courts seek to explore the distinction between assessment of parenting potential (which allows a direction under Section 38(6) to be given) and parental therapy (which does not). Thorpe LJ reminds courts that the crucial question is whether what is proposed actually confers jurisdiction under Section 38(6). However, what matters is the primary purpose of the proposal: if it is assessment then the fact that it contains a therapeutic element does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Here the judge draws the attention to and commends the concept of 'concurrent planning' whereby a child is placed with foster parents who are willing both to facilitate rehabilitation within a prescribed timescale and also, if such fails, to be the permanent carers. In any event local authorities, where adoption is a potential outcome, should heed the guidance in the Children Act Advisory Committee's Handbook of Best Practice ie to proceed as far with the planning for adoption as will not pre-empt the decision of the court.

This unusual case concerned an application by a local authority (supported by parents but opposed by GAL) for leave to withdraw care proceedings as the parents' care for the new baby was exemplary. The judge refused leave as she thought that the local authority's assessment had not dealt adequately with the serious problems that had arisen in the care of older children. Such refusal (said the judge) did not contravene ECHR Article 8(1).

The fun is over! The Court of Appeal has now resolved the conflicting first instance decisions on the construction of Sections 31(8) and 105(6) of the Act - as to which local authority should be designated under a care under when more than one has been involved. They have opted for the simple approach. The law would now seem to be:

• The word 'ordinarily' must be read into Section 31(8)(b) as qualifying the word 'resident'.
• The Court must therefore first consider where a child was 'ordinarily resident' before the beginning of any disregard period under Section 105(6).
• If the child was not 'ordinarily resident' anywhere then the general rule is that the authority to be designated is that in which the facts arose (or principally arose) which carried the case over the Section 31(2) 'threshold criteria'.
• This decision arises not from any exercise of discretion but from a determination of fact.

This is another vivid illustration of the problems that can arise from clash of culture or religion in separated families. It is noteworthy for Wall J's comment that these issues must be determined subject to Section 1 and that therefore it would be unusual (but not impossible) for the court to order that a child should be brought up in a religion not practised by the parent with whom the child resides.

The father was seriously injured in an accident resulting in serious deficiencies in his intellectual functioning which, through no fault of his own, led to intimidating behaviour. Refusing a PRO the judge held that the granting of an order presupposed a capacity to exercise parental responsibility which was not present in this case.

Where a case involves the removal of a child to a non-convention country with a different system of law, it should ordinarily be transferred to a Judge of the Division.

Although this is not a Children Act case, it is included as this problem can arise in relation to enforcement. Here a man with 'severe disabilities' disobeyed an injunction and the question arose as to the requisite capacity to be liable to committal. The court said this:

Another cautionary tale of how a case can get completely out of hand - with potentially expensive (and awkward) consequences for those responsible.