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Home > Publications > Forms & Guidance > Guidance for professionals > 1999 - Part 2

1999 - Part 2
Issue 23

Leading Case

» (RE P (SECTION 91(14) GUIDELINES) (RESIDENCE AND RELIGIOUS HERITAGE) [1999] 2 FLR 573

RE P (A CHILD: RESIDENCE ORDER: CHILD'S WELFARE) [1999] 2 FCR 289 (CA)

Practice Points

» RE B (ADOPTION ORDER: NATIONALITY) [1999] 1 FLR 907; 1 FCR 529 [H.L.]
» RE KR (ABDUCTION: FOCRIBLE REMOVAL BY PARENTS) [1999] 2 FLR 542 (SINGER J)
» RE L (SECTION 37 DIRECTION) [1999] 1 FLR 984 (CA)
» GLOUCESTERSHIRE C.C. V P [1999] 2 FLR 61 (CA)
» RE D (SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATIONS FOR CARE ORDER AND FREEING ORDER) [1999] 2 FLR 49 (CA)
» RE M (LEAVE TO REMOVE CHILD FROM THE JURISDICTION) [1999] 2 FLR 334 (HALE J)
» RE K (SUPERVISION ORDERS) [1999] 2 FLR 303 (WALL J)
» RE M (TERMINATING APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM [1999] 2 FCR 625 (KIRKWOOD J)

LEADING CASE

(RE P (SECTION 91(14) GUIDELINES) (RESIDENCE AND RELIGIOUS HERITAGE) [1999] 2 FLR 573

RE P (A CHILD: RESIDENCE ORDER: CHILD'S WELFARE) [1999] 2 FCR 289 (CA)
(a)
Question: When and upon what basis may the court restrict the making of future applications pursuant to Section 91(14) of the Act?
(b)
Facts: An orthodox Jewish family had concluded shortly after birth that they could not care for a daughter with Down's Syndrome; the local authority, after a long and fruitless search for orthodox Jewish foster parents, had placed the child with non-practising Roman Catholics. At the end of lengthy litigation (the child having been in this house for 8 years) the judge refused the parents' application for residence, made an order for restricted contact and also an order under Section 91(14).
(c)
Decision: (upholding the judge)

That although no real criticism could be made of the parents' conduct of proceedings, the order was required and the court offered guidance (pp 592-3/310-1);

  1. Section 91(14) should be read as subject to Section 1.
  2. The power under Section 91(14) is an exercise of discretion.
  3. It is a significant intrusion on legal rights.
  4. The order should therefore be the exception and not the rule.
  5. It is a useful weapon of last resort in cases of repeated and unreasonable applications.
  6. If the child's welfare demands it, however, it is not confined to such cases.
  7. It may be used if two conditions are satisfied: first, the case goes beyond the usual problems of setting-in time and hostility; and secondly in the absence of an order if the child or primary carers will be subject to ‘unacceptable strain'.
  8. The court may act of its own motion provided parties have been given the opportunity to be heard.
  9. The order may be with or without restriction of time.
  10. The court should specify the type of application which is to be restrained as well as the duration of the order.
  11. Only most exceptionally should the order be made ex parte.
(d)
Comment:
  1. This case hopefully resolves many of the difficulties experienced in practice based on the courts' understanding of the line of cases culminating in B v B [1997] 1 FLR 139 (Leading Case 97/2 in this series).

  2. No longer is it necessary to look only (or even mainly) at the conduct of proceedings provided that the exceptional nature of the order is borne in mind.

  3. It is important in making an order to specify what types of applications are being restricted and for how long.

  4. The Court of Appeal is satisfied that an order under Section 91(14) does not contravene the E.C.H.R.

  5. Any application for leave under Section 91(14) to make an application should in the first instance be made ex parte; the court can then decide whether to refuse the application or list it for an inter partes hearing with or without statements. It is possible to request a Section 7 report (particularly if the child is older) before finally determining the application for leave.

  6. The test to be applied on such an application for leave is - "...the applicant must persuade the judge that he has an arguable case with some chance of success. That is not a formidable hurdle to surmount".

PRACTICE POINTS

(19) RE B (ADOPTION ORDER: NATIONALITY) [1999] 1 FLR 907; 1 FCR 529 [H.L.]

The House of Lords have decided that acquisition of British Nationality is a real benefit which the court must consider under Section 6 of the 1976 Act and, provided real parental responsibility was to be exercised by the adopters, should not be subject to public policy requirements. No further comment is made as each such case will usually be suitable for transfer to the High Court.

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(20) RE KR (ABDUCTION: FOCRIBLE REMOVAL BY PARENTS) [1999] 2 FLR 542 (SINGER J)

This case makes interesting reading both for its facts and, in particular, for the Judge's observations on how courts may react when, in issues of child welfare, the cultural assumptions and customs of minority ethnic communities conflict with those of the majority culture.

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(21) RE L (SECTION 37 DIRECTION) [1999] 1 FLR 984 (CA)

A direction under Section 37 should only be made where "...it appeared that it might be appropriate to make a public law order". The court expressly approved the approach of Wall J in RE CE (SECTION 37 DIRECTION) [1995] 1 FLR 26 and thus the guidance offered by the Children Act Advisory Committee in its Guide to Best Practice.

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(22) GLOUCESTERSHIRE C.C. V P [1999] 2 FLR 61 (CA)

The Court of Appeal (by a majority) held that the court could, acting of its own motion under Section 10 of the Act, make a residence order in favour of foster parents who were themselves disqualified by Section 9(3) from applying for leave to seek such an order for themselves. The Court of Appeal recognised that this was a difficult point and emphasised that the making of any such order "....would be a most exceptional order".

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(23) RE D (SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATIONS FOR CARE ORDER AND FREEING ORDER) [1999] 2 FLR 49 (CA)

Here the Court of Appeal hold that where such applications are being heard together, that for the care order should be considered first so that the test in Section 1 of the 1989 Act takes precedence over that in Section 6 of the 1976 Act.

The court also draws attention to two problems of practice:

  • the need for the court to appreciate the division of responsibility between the court and the local authority and for the court to insist on the one and not trespass on the other; and
  • the need for caution in evaluating and weighing evidence in child welfare cases given by adult psychiatrists in support of their vulnerable patient: whose needs are really being considered?

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(24) RE M (LEAVE TO REMOVE CHILD FROM THE JURISDICTION) [1999] 2 FLR 334 (HALE J)

In those (no doubt unusual) cases where a parent needed leave to remove from the jurisdiction before being able to apply for permission to enter a new country, and so could not make the usually required detailed proposals about home, education and contact etc, it was open to the court to grant conditional leave thus allowing the other parent to restore the case if the matters the subject of conditional leave had not been satisfactorily resolved. The judge added these words of caution:

"I should add that my conclusion in this case should not be seen as carte blanche for other speculative applications for leave to remove. Such an application is only likely to be granted if there are good reasons for making it at an early stage and the court can be satisfied of the good sense and responsibility of the parent making it". (P 345A).
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(25) RE K (SUPERVISION ORDERS) [1999] 2 FLR 303 (WALL J)

This case serves as a reminder of the right of the Guardian ad Litem both in respect of the ‘threshold criteria' and any proposed order to advance submissions in conflict with those agreed between the local authority and (usually) the parents. However, at p 314, Wall J has this to say:

"....my view remains....that where the local authority and the parents have reached a sensible agreement which clearly, as here, protects the child and is in no sense collusive, a Guardian ad Litem should think long and hard before he seeks to upset that agreement or put forward alternative contentious proposals".
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(26) RE M (TERMINATING APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM [1999] 2 FCR 625 (KIRKWOOD J)

This case contains a valuable review of the rules and procedures involved in terminating (or considering so doing) the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem by reasons of complaint against him in a case. It is of some particular interest to those concerned with the role and functions of the Designated Family Judge.




 



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