This document is the post-consultation report for the consultation paper, Damages for Future Loss: Giving Courts the Power to Order Periodical Payments for Future Loss and Care Costs in Personal Injury Cases.
It will cover:
the background to the report
a summary of responses to the consultation
the detailed responses to specific questions raised in the consultation
the next steps following this report
Further copies of this report can be obtained by contacting Iram Akhtar at the address given below:
Lord Chancellor's Department
Civil Law Development Division
Southside
105 Victoria Street
London SW1E 6QT
Telephone: 020-7210 1226
E-mail: Iram Akhtar
The consultation paper Damages for future loss: Giving the courts the power to order periodical payments for future loss and care costs in personal injury cases was published on 13 March 2002. It invited comments on proposals to give courts in England, Wales and Northern Ireland power to order periodical payments for future loss and care costs in personal injury cases.
Section 2(1) of the Damages Act 1996 allows courts to make an order for periodical payments with the consent of the parties. The consultation paper sought views on whether courts should be able to exercise this power without consent. Views were also sought on various related issues, including the method of funding periodical payments and whether such payments should be reviewable.
A list of the respondents is at Annex A.
A total of 58 responses were received, although not all respondents answered every question. Respondents included members of the judiciary, legal and medical professions, insurers, financial advisers, trade unions and Government departments. Figure 1 shows the breakdown by sector of those who responded to this consultation.
To the central proposal that courts should be given the power to order periodical payments without consent, 57% of those who responded agreed, with a further 14% expressing qualified agreement. 64% thought the power should be extended to claims under the Fatal Accidents Act and 89% thought it should be possible to award provisional damages by way of periodical payments. A majority of consultees considered that the legislation should not provide a presumption in favour of periodical payments.
A clear majority of consultees favoured some form of review. 86% of those who responded agreed that there should be a paper application for permission to review.
91% of consultees considered that the current benefit regulations create inappropriate incentives or other anomalies.
Most consultees agreed with the assumptions made in the partial Regulatory Impact Assessment. Some thought that the costs associated with reviewable periodical payments were likely to be higher than was envisaged in the consultation paper.
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of responses to each question.
| Figure One - Breakdown of respondents by sector |
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| Figure Two - Breakdown of responses to questions |
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Q1. Do you agree that the courts should have the power to order that damages for future losses in personal injury cases should be paid in the form of periodical payments?
The majority of consultees supported this proposal, with 40 consultees agreeing that the courts should be given the power to order periodical payments. This included 8 expressions of qualified agreement where consultees felt that the power should be available only in certain circumstances. 16 consultees opposed the proposal. Figure 3 illustrates this:
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There was general consensus, even among those who opposed the removal of the requirement for consent, that the use of periodical payments should be encouraged. As one consultee commented: "periodical payments provide the most accurate method of compensating victims of personal injury, and remove many of the uncertainties inherent in the lump sum system".
Those in favour of a judicial power to order without consent argued that it was necessary in order to effect a change in the existing legal culture and promote the use of periodical payments. A consultee from the legal sector pointed out that under the present system: "the lack of any power in the court to impose a structured settlement has led, in my experience, to unsatisfactory results".
Other arguments in favour included the transfer of investment risk from claimant to defendant and the prevention of the dissipation of awards, thus preserving claimants' ability to pay future care costs. One consultee commented that periodical payments enable claimants of borderline capacity to participate as fully as possible in their own financial decision making.
Some consultees who gave qualified support to the proposal considered that the power to order should only be exercised against the will of the claimant in exceptional circumstances; only where the claimant is a child or patient; or where payment would be through an annuity to guarantee security of payment.
The primary argument of those who opposed the proposal was that claimants should have the right to choose how their damages are paid, and be able to take advantage of the flexibility offered by lump sum awards. Some consultees argued that claimants preferred lump sums, and were concerned that the possible imposition of periodical payments might force claimants to settle for a reduced award out of court in order to receive a lump sum. Other arguments cited a lack of insurance products to meet any increased need for periodical payments; the parties' wish for a clean break and an undermining of the consensual approach to litigation.
A number of consultees who were opposed to a general power to impose periodical payments suggested that the courts should require parties to consider such payments in all appropriate cases.
Although there was no specific question in the consultation paper relating to the calculation of damages, the answers to this question showed general support for the 'bottom up' method, which was thought to be the most accurate way of calculating compensation. A number of consultees also considered that the use of the 'top down' method would continue to promote a lump sum payment culture. Several consultees considered that annuity backed periodical payments should be linked to an index other than the RPI, in order to reflect more rapidly rising care cost inflation.
Q2. Should the legislation include a presumption that for larger cases periodical payments will be the preferred form of payment unless there is a good reason not to?
The responses to this question showed a majority of consultees against a presumption in favour of periodical payments. 29 consultees disagreed with the proposal, 24 consultees supported a presumption, although of these 9 consultees qualified their agreement. Figure 4 shows the breakdown of responses:
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The main concern of those opposed to a presumption was that it would be too restrictive of the court's discretion and that it would be preferable to leave it to the courts to decide whether periodical payments are appropriate on a case by case basis, with appropriate guidance (probably in a Practice Direction).
A number of consultees thought that unless a statutory presumption was very clear it could lead to satellite litigation. Potential difficulties were also identified in defining the categories of case to which a presumption should apply, as quantum alone was not considered adequate.
There was also a view that until practice has shown the circumstances in which periodical payments are more appropriate than lump sums, a presumption would be premature. One consultee suggested that this might be overcome by applying the presumption initially only in cases where the court already has settlement approval powers, i.e. cases involving patients and children, until experience had demonstrated other appropriate circumstances. Some consultees who were opposed to a statutory presumption favoured a Practice Direction to provide guidance to the courts and practitioners and to encourage the use of periodical payments.
Some consultees who disagreed favoured an alternative mechanism of promoting periodical payments. As in question one, there was a call for parties to be required at an early stage to consider the use of periodical payments. 2 consultees argued that failure to do so should attract cost sanctions.
Consultees in favour of a presumption argued that it was needed to support the proposed power of imposition and to provide, as one response put it, "a strong steer" to encourage periodical payments both in and out of court. There was also a view that a presumption would be necessary in order to prevent claimants from tying up court time arguing for lump sum awards and that without it, the situation would not differ much from the present consensual system.
Some consultees qualified their support for a presumption by saying it should not be too prescriptive; calling for parties' wishes to be taken into account when the court was exercising it; recommending that it apply only to heads of damage for care and equipment costs; and only where the future loss was over £500k.
Q3. In what circumstances might a lump sum be more appropriate for all or part of the future losses?
Consultees cited a variety of circumstances in which a lump sum might be more appropriate than periodical payments. There was support for a practice direction to assist the court in determining the most appropriate method of compensation, although a small number of consultees were concerned that this might preclude proper examination of the particular circumstances of each case.
It was widely agreed that where damages did not contain an element of continuing loss, for example, "one-off" capital outlays for accommodation, equipment, transport, retraining or investment in a business start-up, a lump sum would be the most appropriate method of compensation.
Some consultees considered a lump sum to be suitable in all cases where claimants were of full capacity and wanted to control their own investment. Other circumstances suggested included significant contributory negligence; emigration by claimant; questions over the future security of the defendant or defendant insurer; short life expectancy; loss of earnings; the provision of a contingency fund; and where there was a low indemnity limit on the defendant's liability insurance policy and the claim was significantly higher.
Q4. Should (i) the power to order periodical payments, or (ii) any presumption in favour of periodical payments, apply to cases under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976?
The majority of consultees agreed that the court should have the power to order periodical payments in fatal accident cases, but opposed a presumption. 34 consultees agreed to the first part of the question, although a number thought it unlikely that such a power would be used very often. 19 consultees disagreed. Only 3 consultees explicitly supported a presumption in favour of periodical payments in fatal accident cases. Figure 5 shows the breakdown of responses to 4(i).
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Those in favour of the power to order periodical payments in fatal accident cases saw it as a logical extension of the proposed power in personal injury cases. Some consultees also argued that periodical payments were more suited to loss of dependency than lump sums because they were able to replicate the loss of income stream more accurately. Circumstances cited where periodical payments might be appropriate were those where the period of future dependency was lengthy, or the dependent was under a disability.
A number of consultees considered that because fatal accident claims did not frequently generate substantial damages or include care costs, lump sums would usually be the more appropriate method of compensation and the power to order periodical payments would be used very rarely. The need for a clean break was the main argument cited by those who opposed the power to order periodical payments in fatal accident cases. It was felt that most dependants would prefer not to have an ongoing relationship with the defendant or defendant insurer.
Q5. Do you agree that insurers should have the option of self funding, provided the court was satisfied about the security of periodical payments?
The majority of consultees agreed that insurers should have the option of self- funding, as it would allow them increased flexibility to fund court ordered periodical payments. Of the 34 consultees who supported the proposal, almost all emphasised that their support was subject to overcoming the practical issues set out in the consultation paper, the most significant being the security of payments in the event of the failure of the insurer. 13 consultees opposed the proposal. Figure 6 shows the breakdown of responses:
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Most of those who supported the principle of self-funding thought that an amendment to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme extending 100% protection to self funded payments would provide adequate security for such payments. A number of consultees were concerned that the courts did not have the expertise to assess an insurer's future solvency, and that courts should not be expected to "police" insurers. One consultee proposed that the Government should draw up a list of approved self-funders.
Of those consultees who agreed with the principle of self funding many, including most of the insurance sector respondents, considered it unlikely that insurers would self fund as a matter of course; their preference being to write off outstanding liabilities to a life insurer. One insurer commented that although "...insurers should be able to self fund periodical payments...it is unlikely that we would offer self-funded periodical payments, but would choose to finance by means of annuities bought on the open market." It was also suggested that reserving difficulties and additional administrative costs would further discourage frequent self-funding.
Among those not in favour of the self-funding option, opposition rested on the practical hurdles of security and reserving mentioned above, and a concern that it would increase insurance premiums.
Q6. Are there other funding options that might offer adequate security?
Most of those who responded to this question considered annuities or self funding to be the only viable funding options. Alternative options put forward included payment in kind, particularly in the case of claimants injured by the NHS; the defendant to pay for care directly to the service provider; specific Treasury issued personal injury gilts; or a mutual company underwritten by the entire insurance industry (akin to the Motor Insurers Bureau).
There was some debate over whether the court should be involved in funding decisions, as they might lack expertise on this particular issue. A number of consultees favoured funding being left up to defendants provided that the court was satisfied with their security, although a few consultees felt that this would place unreasonable uncertainty on claimants.
Q7. Do you agree that using Rule 44.3(4) is the best approach to dealing with offers to settle on the basis of periodical payments?
Consultees considered it vital that some form of cost sanctions was retained in the context of periodical payments in the interests of promoting settlement, but opinions diverged as to how this would best be achieved. The majority of consultees agreed that Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules as it stands would not be appropriate in cases involving periodical payments. 31 consultees felt that Rule 44.3(4) would be the best approach, but 13 of these considered that the rule would need to be altered and supported by additional guidance in order to work effectively. 13 consultees disagreed with the use of Rule 44.3(4) in dealing with offers to settle. Figure 7 shows the breakdown of responses.
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Although most consultees took the view that Part 36 was not appropriate, they commented on its usefulness in bringing about settlement and thought it important that the impetus it provided should not be lost under a non-consensual periodical payment system. One consultee commented that whatever mechanism was used, "the key point is that sanctions are known to exist".
Those who expressed qualified agreement to the use of Rule 44.3(4) argued that the term 'admissible offer' would have to be very clearly defined in any Practice Direction. It was suggested that the judge should indicate at an early case management stage whether a case was suitable for periodical payments, as this would allow parties to determine whether Part 36 offers would be appropriate. A number of consultees argued that parties should be compelled to give reasons for any rejection of an offer to settle.
Those who opposed the use of Rule 44.3(4) argued that it carried no certainty of cost sanctions and therefore did not provide an adequate incentive to settle.
One consultee commented: "There is a difference between the imperative nature of Part 36 and the discretionary nature of Rule 44.3(4). Settlements will be encouraged and promoted if Part 36 applies and a claimant appreciates that there is a risk on costs. Settlement will not be promoted if the claimant has the comfort of the less certain sanctions of Rule 44.3(4)"
Some consultees considered it a shortcoming that under Rule 44.3(4), costs were awarded in hindsight by a costs judge who had no knowledge of the conduct of the case, rather than by the trial judge as under Part 36. Part 36 was still thought to be an effective settlement tool in the context of periodical payments by a few consultees, although they recognised that any quantum comparisons would inevitably be more complicated. Suggestions regarding how to make Part 36 a more appropriate settlement mechanism under periodical payments included giving parties longer to consider offers, and requiring parties to provide reasons for rejecting offers.
A number of consultees considered that whatever settlement mechanism is used, the financial cost of investigating any offer should be recoverable by the claimant regardless of whether he/ she accepts that offer.
Q8. Do you consider that any of the current benefits regulations create inappropriate incentives or other anomalies and if so, what are they and how could they be remedied?
Most consultees agreed that the current benefits regulations created a disincentive to the use of periodical payments and that the relevant legislation was in need of review. Only 4 consultees did not think that there was a need for change.
Figure 8 shows the breakdown of responses:
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There was a general consensus that the means testing regulations were complicated and needed to be rationalised so that income from lump sums and periodical payments was treated in the same way. Bell-v- Todd [2001] All ER (D) 348 (Jun) was cited by a number of consultees to highlight the anomaly between treatment of income from periodical payments and that from a lump sum in relation to Local Authority provision of care. Beattie -v- Secretary of State for Social Security [2001] WLR 1404 was also referred to, which concluded that the stream of income under a structured settlement was taken into account for means tested benefits purposes. One consultee commented that the "...current interpretation of Regulations by the judiciary has thrown up anomalies. The approach should be to ensure clarity, consistent fairness to taxpayers, local authorities, claimants and insurers."
Consultees thought that uniformity in approach to the treatment of lump sums and periodical payments would ensure that claimants receiving periodical payments were not disadvantaged, and would encourage the use of such payments. A number of consultees considered that such an approach should include the treatment of awards held in the Court of Protection, as current regulations disadvantaged the competent claimant.
Beyond calling for uniformity in approach, very few consultees specified what form this approach should take. 2 favoured a system whereby all damages would be exempt when assessing benefits, and one suggested that this would avoid present difficulties where indemnities were sought because of uncertainty over a claimant's future liability to a local authority. There was a suggestion that if the claimant is compensated on a continuing basis, then such payments should be taken into account when assessing entitlement to benefit to avoid double compensation.
4 consultees suggested that the complex issues relating to benefits could be avoided if the tortfeasor was obliged to repay separately those who had provided and would provide for the consequences of the injury. This approach would mean that neither capital nor income would be disregarded when assessing means-tested benefits, but the burden of loss would lie on the tortfeasor.
Q9. Do you agree that it would be desirable to prevent or regulate the factoring of structured awards? If so, is the best approach to bar claimants from assigning periodical payments? If not, how should this issue be tackled?
There was widespread support for the prevention of factoring by barring the assignment of periodical payments. 43 consultees favoured this approach, 9 of whom expressed qualified agreement. Only 6 consultees opposed the prevention of factoring. Figure 9 shows the breakdown of responses:
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Factoring was seen as undermining the purpose for which periodical payments were intended, and increasing the likelihood that claimants would fall back on the State. As one consultee commented, "The justification of preventing or regulating the factoring of structured or periodic awards lies in the overall objective...of ensuring that the compensation awarded or agreed lasts as long as it is required."
A number of consultees argued that it was important to prevent factoring entirely as regulation could prove to be expensive and open to abuse. One consultee suggested the Canadian model as an alternative to banning assignment, whereby the claimant does not have any direct rights because the annuity is owned by the defendant/insurer, but the contract requires irrevocable payments in favour of the claimant in order to protect him or her from the insolvency of the defendant/insurer.
Those who expressed qualified support for banning the assignment of periodical payments suggested that, in exceptional circumstances, the claimant should be able to return to court to request that payments were assigned or commuted to a lump sum.
Those who did not favour the prevention of factoring argued that it would interfere with the claimants' right to choose how to spend their damages, and that valid reasons might exist for commuting periodical payments to a lump sum.
Q10. Do you agree that it should be possible to award provisional and further damages by way of periodical payments?
41 consultees agreed that provisional and further damages could be payable by periodical payments, providing it was in respect of significant future loss and did not affect the tax treatment of periodical payments. Only 5 consultees explicitly disagreed with the proposal, because they saw provisional damages as creating problems for insurers. It was pointed out that few provisional damages were awarded in practice. Figure 10 shows the breakdown of responses:
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Q11. Do you agree that orders for periodical payments should be open to review only:
for medical deterioration or improvement, and for changes in care, where they can be foreseen at the time of the original order and the possibility of review is provided for in that order;
in exceptional life changing circumstances, on the application of either party; and if so, in what circumstances might a review be appropriate?
If not, should there be more or less reviewability and in what circumstances?
This question drew a wide range of responses. A majority of consultees were in favour of the principle of review. 37 consultees supported some form of review, while 17 consultees opposed reviewability. Figure 11 shows the breakdown of responses in relation to the issue of review in general:
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The principal argument in favour of review was that it provides the most accurate way of meeting claimants' needs, without over or under compensation.
In relation to the two options set out in the consultation paper, 17 consultees considered there should be a right of review triggered by a foreseeable medical deterioration or improvement, and provided for in the original court order. Of these, 10 supported in addition the inclusion of exceptional life changing circumstances as a ground for review. 11 consultees thought the proposal in the paper were too restrictive and suggested additional circumstances in which a review might be appropriate. For example, it was suggested that there should be a general right to review, subject to the discretion of the court; that there should be review if there were significant changes in the fundamental circumstances or assumptions upon which the award was founded; and that a review should take account of changes in medical technology or economic factors. The remainder of the responses in favour agreed with review in principle, some making other suggestions as to how a review system should work.
Those who opposed reviewability advanced a number of arguments. The most prominent of these was both parties' wish for finality and certainty. Responses from the insurance sector argued that reviews would cause serious problems for the insurance industry in terms of reinsuring and reserving and that this would inevitably lead to higher insurance premiums. Other arguments opposing reviews included the possibility of intrusive surveillance of claimants, discouragement of rehabilitation, uneven reviews (as it was thought that in practice only a claimant would apply for a review), reopening of causation issues and increased legal costs. One consultee considered that flexible annuities meant that payments could be structured to meet many contingencies, thus rendering the need for review unnecessary.
Q12. Should there be a paper application for permission to review (except where the original order provides that permission is unnecessary), with the right to an oral hearing if either party objects to the decision on paper. If not, how should applications for review be dealt with?
Of the 43 responses to this question, 37 agreed that there should be a paper application for permission to review. Figure 12 shows the breakdown of responses:
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The need for robust control and filter of reviews was recognised, and a paper application to review was generally agreed to be the most effective way of ensuring unmeritorious applications did not incur high court and legal costs. One consultee said "If there is to be reviewability, a paper application should be mandatory even when the original order considers it unnecessary. An oral hearing should be restricted to limited circumstances and only after refusal of permission on paper".
The few consultees who disagreed with a paper application considered that reviews should only be dealt with orally because they would be exceptional and contentious.
There was also a suggestion that one Master should be assigned to all review cases, and that there should be a designated number of special judges with experience of personal injury work to deal with reviews.
Q13 – 22 – Partial Regulatory Impact Assessment
Questions 13 to 22 sought information to assist in completion of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) on the proposals which accompanied the consultation paper. Not all respondents answered these questions, and the responses to some were very low.
Responses are summarised below.
31 respondents commented on the assumptions made and factors to be considered. Most respondents agreed with the assumptions made in the partial RIA. However, 4 consultees were concerned that the estimates of the legal costs associated with a non-consensual periodical payment system were optimistic and the introduction of review was likely to increase these costs. The erosion of the limit of indemnity in the event of review was highlighted as a possible impact by a number of consultees.
On the issue of an appropriate cut-off point for the purpose of the assessment, responses were fairly evenly split between those who suggested that the benchmark should be £250K, on the basis of the current NHS practice in seeking to negotiate structured settlements, and those, mainly from the insurance and financial sectors, who believed this figure to be too low to ensure adequate funds for care for the future life of the claimant. They suggested that £500K would be a more appropriate cut-off point. It was pointed out that it was not only the quantum of the award that determines the suitability of an award for periodical payments but the circumstances of the claimant and the length of time over which the award is intended to last. Many thought that any limit should relate to future losses and not the entire award.
4 consultees considered that there should be no threshold figure as suitability for periodical payments should not be considered on the basis of arbitrary numbers, but rather as one consultee put it:"whether the type of case is suitable for a periodical payments order and whether it would be financially viable to the insurers".
Most consultees who responded agreed that life expectancy estimates are usually under or overestimated, although mortality tables were of some assistance. Very few large awards were settled by way of periodical payments and in these the proportion of future losses structured varied between 20% and 80%. Most of those that responded agreed that provisional damages were awarded in very few cases; and further that the proportion of cases likely to involve an unforeseeable change in claimants' circumstances leading to a significant change in care requirements was almost negligible.
The consultation paper suggested that, typically, the costs of investing and managing a lump sum constituted between 3% and 5% of a typical large award. Responses to the consultation offered a range of suggestions between 1% and over 5%, although the most common estimate fell within the range of 3-5%.
The consultation demonstrated that there is widespread support for promoting the use of periodical payments to compensate for future loss and care costs. The majority of those who responded to the consultation agreed with the Government's proposal that the courts should have the power to order periodical payments without consent. The Government therefore intends to legislate to implement the proposal as soon as a suitable opportunity arises. It is intended that the power will extend to the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The Government does not propose to include in the legislation a presumption in favour of periodical payments, but will consider how best to provide guidance on the use of periodical payments in order to facilitate their use wherever appropriate.
Consultees welcome a more flexible approach to the funding of periodical payments, whilst recognising that annuity-backed periodical payments are likely to remain the norm in privately funded cases. The important issue is that the long-term security of payments can be guaranteed and the Government will consider what changes may be needed to the legislation and other regulations to facilitate this.
Consultees agree that factoring of periodical payments should not be allowed and the Government intends to provide for this.
Although most consultees consider that Rule 44.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules is a more appropriate mechanism than Part 36 in determining costs in relation to offers to settle for periodical payments, amendments to the Rule may be needed for it to work effectively. Further consideration will be given to this issue.
Consultees consider that the regulations regarding means tested benefits and periodical payments are complicated and anomalous. Changes have since been made to relevant regulations by both the Department for Work and Pensions and the Department of Health. These will ensure greater consistency in the treatment of personal injury awards in respect of means tested benefits.
A majority of consultees support a system of review although there is a range of opinion on the extent to which review should be available. Most agree that applications for review should be closely controlled. The Government recognises that the right balance must be struck between ensuring that claimants receive compensation which accurately reflects their needs without imposing unacceptable burdens on the NHS and insurers. The Government is minded to adopt a cautious approach initially, retaining flexibility to make adjustments in the light of experience, and consulting widely on any subsequent changes. It is intended to liaise with Government departments, the judiciary, and other key stakeholders to help create an effective system that best reflects the balance required.
A final regulatory impact assessment will be prepared.
| Action for Victims of Medical Accidents (AVMA) |
| Alison Brooks, Barratts, Solicitors |
| Anthony Goldstaub QC |
| Association of British Insurers (ABI) |
| Berrymans Lace Mawers, Solicitors |
| Bevon Ashford, Solicitors |
| British Medical Association (BMA) |
| Browne Jacobson, Solicitors |
| Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution |
| Civil Sub-Committee of HM Council of Circuit Judges |
| Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel (CICAP) |
| Department of Health |
| DLA, Solicitors |
| Forum of Insurance Lawyers (FOIL) |
| Frenkel Topping Ltd |
| Herbert Smith, Solicitors |
| Hilton Sharp and Clarke, Forensic Accountants |
| His Honour Judge David Richardson |
| Horizon Portfolio Management |
| Iain Goldrein QC |
| Irwin Mitchell, Solicitors |
| James Chapman & Co, Solicitors |
| Law Reform Advisory Committee for Northern Ireland |
| Lloyds Insurers |
| London Solicitors Litigation Association |
| Martin S Bruffell, Solicitor |
| Master Denzil Lush, Master of the Court of Protection |
| Medical Defence Union (MDU) |
| Motor Accident Solicitors Society |
| Munich Reinsurance Ltd |
| National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) |
| NFU Mutual Insurance Society |
| Norwich Union Insurance Ltd |
| Palser Grossman, Solicitors |
| PKF, Forensic Accountants |
| Raymond Machell QC |
| Richard Cropper, Specialist Financial Planner |
| Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance plc |
| RSM Robson Rhodes, Accountants |
| St Paul International Insurance Company Ltd |
| Tenon Financial Services Ltd |
| The Association of District Judges |
| The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL) |
| The Chamber of Experts (COE) |
| The Civil Justice Council |
| The Clinical Disputes Forum |
| The Faculty and Institute of Actuaries and the Association of Consulting Actuaries |
| The Institute of Legal Executives |
| The Lord Chancellor's Strategic Investment Board (SIB) |
| The Medical and Dental Defence Union of Scotland |
| The Medical Protection Society (MPS) |
| The Ogden Working Party |
| The Personal Injury Bar Association Working Party |
| The Trades Union Congress (TUC) |
| Thompsons, Solicitors |
| UNISON |
| Wellington Underwriting plc |
| Windsor Life Assurance Company Ltd |
| Other materials submitted for information by: |
| Independent Living Fund |
| Pannone and Partners |
| A I Cherry, Chartered Accountant |