1. Introduction
2. Section A
3. Section B
Annexes
A GLMCA Facts and Figures
B Access to Justice Bill
Provisions
C Key Milestones
D Map
E Magistrates' Courts Properties
in Outer London
1.1 This paper sets out, as a basis for consultation, some of the principal implementation issues connected with the setting up of a Greater London Magistrates' Courts Authority from 1 April 2001. Many helpful discussions have taken place between officials from the Lord Chancellor's Department, other Government Departments, Criminal Justice Agencies and representatives from the magistrates' courts service in London. The objective of the paper is to seek the views of the magistrates, magistrates' courts committees, staff and other interested parties on the proposals and questions outlined, and establish whether any key implementation details have been overlooked; It does not attempt to cover all the many issues which will arise before the GLMCA is established.
1.2 Copies are being sent to:
all the magistrates in Greater London;
all the Magistrates' Courts Committees in Greater London;
the inner and outer London local authorities and the Corporation of the City of London.
1.3. In addition to the Departments and Agencies which have already involved in internal discussions copies of the paper are also being sent to the following:
Metropolitan Police Service;
City of London Police;
Members of Parliament for London constituencies;
Association of London Government;
Local and National staff associations;
Members of Magistrates' Courts Consultative Council.
1.4. If you would like to comment on any of the proposals in this paper, please send your responses to the following address by 14 May 1999:
1.5. Further copies of this paper can be obtained from the above address.
1.6. When responding it would be helpful if you explain who you are and, where relevant, who you represent.
1.7. Please ensure that you mark your response clearly if you wish the Government to keep your name and the contents of your response confidential. Otherwise, your name and the general contents of your response may be made public in response to questions under the Open Government initiative.
1.8. The Government's objectives for the magistrates' courts service across England and Wales were set out in the Lord Chancellor's statement to Parliament on 29 October 1997. In essence, these are;
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the magistrates' courts;
to reduce delay in the time taken for cases to be taken through those courts; and
to improve the co-ordination of, and communication within, the criminal justice system as a whole.
1.9 The Government is convinced that considerable progress towards achieving these objectives will follow from;
better distribution and use of the public resources the Government commits to the magistrates' courts; and
better and more flexible deployment of professional judicial resources.
1.10. Further to this, a joint statement by the Home Secretary, Lord Chancellor and Attorney General on 21 July 1998 emphasised that all those in the criminal justice system need to work together to make the system better able to achieve the Government's overarching aims: to reduce crime and the fear of crime, and their social and economic costs; and to dispense justice fairly and efficiently, and to promote confidence in the rule of law. The national joint strategic planning across the whole of the criminal justice system will need to be supported by effective local arrangements.
1.11 The Government believes the national objectives can be best achieved through a greater alignment of boundaries of the magistrates' courts committees with those of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). This will lead to a closer integration between the agencies in the criminal justice system, to improvements in communication, co-operation and planning, and better use of resources. Throughout the rest of England and Wales, this is being achieved through the amalgamation, where appropriate, of two or more Magistrates' Courts Committees (MCCs) under section 32 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997 (JPA 97).
1.12 Across London, the Government believes its plans will be achieved more effectively through one single body. However, Greater London is currently served by a significantly greater number of MCCs (22) and local authorities (33) than any other amalgamating area. The consequences of this, for issues such as funding and accommodation, are such that amalgamation under the provisions of JPA 97 would not be practical. For example, for administrative purposes, it is essential that there should be one lead authority to deal with the new MCC and the Lord Chancellor's Department. In other areas of the country, one local authority takes on the lead role, but it would be unreasonable and unprecedented for any one London borough to take on such a large responsibility and workload for the whole of London. As a consequence, the only way forward to achieve a single magistrates' courts body for London is to create a Greater London Magistrates' Courts Authority with its own special arrangements, where appropriate, to cater for these circumstances. Key facts and figures relating to the magistrates' courts in London are included at Annex A.
1.13 Provision for these changes has been made in the Access to Justice Bill which is currently proceeding through Parliament; A copy of the relevant clause is reproduced at Annex B. Copies of the Bill are obtainable from The Stationery Office. Additional clauses are being drafted to deal with financial powers and property arrangements and will be added during the Parliamentary process. Secondary legislation will also be drafted to deal with the finer detail once the Bill has been enacted.
1.14 The Bill will establish a new single body to administer all the Greater London magistrates' courts, replacing the existing 22 MCCs. The new body will be know as the Greater London Magistrates' Courts Authority (GLMCA) and will be the MCC for Greater London. Like other MCCs, the GLMCA will be accountable to both the public and to the Lord Chancellor. This accountability will be enhanced by the fact that the GLMCA will also include members nominated by the new Mayor for London. Current statutory consultation and appeal rights of "paying authorities" under JPA 97 (which relate mainly to budgets and courthouse closures) will be given to each London Borough and the Corporation of the City of London.
1.15 Like other MCCs, the GLMCA will be statutorily responsible for the efficient and effective administration of the magistrates' courts in its area. It will also be given the power to own property, borrow money and levy for part of its funding directly upon the local authorities. Regulations made under the bill will provide for administrative issues such as the GLMCA's membership and procedures, and the appointment process for a justices' chief executive (JCE).
1.16 As with amalgamations elsewhere in England and Wales, a shadow Authority will be set up approximately a year in advance to prepare for the transition. It is planned that the GLMCA will be established from 1 April 2001. Key milestones in the process are outlined at Annex C.
This section covers issues where we are seeking respondents views on a range of options which need to be resolved before the GLMCA can be established.
Size
2.1.1 Currently, each MCC in England and Wales comprises up to 12 members, primarily lay magistrates. An MCC, or the Lord Chancellor himself, may co-opt a further two individuals if it is believed that additional skills are required. MCC members do not currently receive remuneration for their committee work. The Bill contains powers for additional co-optees and for their remuneration.
2.1.2 Inner London is currently slightly different in that, by statute, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is chairman of the Inner London MCC (ILMCC), with reserved places on the committee for two further stipendiary magistrates.
2.1.3 Because of its London-wide strategic role, its ownership of property, and its greater financial role, the GLMCA will have a broader range of functions than a traditional MCC. The GLMCA will also have a significantly larger case-load (with consequential work-force and budget - see Annex A)) than a traditional MCC, and will cover a much larger number of local authorities.
2.1.4 The membership of the GLMCA will, therefore, need a different mix of skills, experience and representation from a traditional MCC. This does not necessarily mean that it needs to be a larger body. Earlier experience of MCCs with up to 24 members (prior to the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 ) showed this to be too large a number for effective committee working; hence the move to an upper limit of 12 (plus co-optees).
Q1. How many members do you think the GLMCA should have? If you think it should have more than other MCCs, what is your rationale behind the increase in number?
Membership
Magistrates
2.1.5 Irrespective of the size of the Authority, a significant proportion of members will still be lay magistrates, selected for their relevant skills, as in other MCCs. This will ensure that, in part, the arrangements for the management of the service in London reflect the arrangements that exist elsewhere in the country. Inner London MCC has expressed the view that for it, the mix of lay and stipendiaries has worked well. Consequently, there is a need to consider whether places should be reserved for stipendiary magistrates and, if so, how many. There is also a need to consider what other members there should be on the Authority.
2.1.6 One important question is the appropriate ratio of magistrate members to the rest. One possible option is for the membership to be on a 50/50 basis i.e. 50% magistrates /50% non- magistrates.
2.1.7 In other MCCs, to provide continuity, only a percentage of the members are replaced each year. All members are subject to Magistrates' Courts Committees (Constitution) Regulations 1994 which relate to their length of tenure as part of a rolling replacement programme. This appears to work well and we see no reason to deviate from it for the GLMCA.
2.1.8 Under these regulations, a selection panel is made up of one magistrate from each bench, and this panel then selects the members of the MCC. This method of selection would not be appropriate for the GLMCA as it would result in a selection panel of 36, which is clearly too unwieldy for effective decision making.
2.1.9 However, once one moves away from the "one representative per bench" formula, it is not clear how magistrates themselves could elect a selection panel since they would have less knowledge of magistrates outside their own bench. If the principle of a selection panel elected by magistrates is to be retained, an alternative mechanism needs to be found. One option would be for bench representatives to be elected, and then for the selection panel to be comprised of a sub-set of this group. A suitable mechanism would have to be found by which this sub-set would be chosen; perhaps a third could serve for each of the three years?
2.1.10 Alternatively, the selection panel could be appointed by an independent third party rather than by magistrates. This raises the question of who would the third party be? It would clearly be inappropriate for the GLMCA itself or the JCE to be involved in these appointments, as the remit of the selection panel would be to appoint magistrate members to the GLMCA.
2.1.11 A final option would be to do away with the requirement that there should be a selection panel, and move directly to the appointment of the magistrate members of the GLMCA by an independent third party, rather than by magistrates.
Q2. What should the proportion of magistrates to non-magisterial members be?
Q3. Should a place (or places) be reserved for a stipendiary magistrate? If so, what proportion/number should it be?
Q4. Which method of selection would you prefer?
b) A selection panel appointed by an independent third party; and if so, who should the third party be (or not be)?
c) Appointment of magistrate members to the GLMCA by an independent third party; (If so, whom)?
d) A different option; If so, what?
Mayoral nominations
2.1.12 In order to recognise the expanded, strategic role of the GLMCA and to enhance the GLMCA's accountability, Ministers have agreed that a proportion of the membership should be nominated by the new Mayor of London. The actual proportion has yet to be settled, but one suggestion is 25%. We are not intending that the nominations should necessarily be limited to Assembly members; This will afford the Mayor the greatest possible scope to nominate those who would best serve the interests of the GLMCA. However, it would be helpful if some, at least, were on both the GLMCA and the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), providing a beneficial strategic link between the two Authorities.
2.1.13 The Mayor will be free to make nominations without the need for the Lord Chancellor's approval of individual appointments, but candidates would be required to satisfy predetermined criteria (which reflect the needs of the GLMCA) set by the Lord Chancellor in his role as responsible Minister. The selection should be non-political and appointment made on the basis of the skills required by the GLMCA.
2.1.14 GLA members are elected for a period of 4 years, so it would be possible for a GLA member to finish their GLA term whilst only part-way through their GLMCA appointment. If the GLA representative is not re-elected to the GLA, they would be replaced on the GLMCA by another GLA member, in order to maintain accountability and links with the MPA.
Q5. What do you think the proportion of Mayoral nominees should be?
Q6. What skills or experience should be reflected in the selection criteria for the selection of Mayoral nominees?
Representation from the London Boroughs
2.1.15 Ministers also consider that there is a case for a proportion of the members to represent the London Boroughs. This would enhance the London-wide accountability to the local authorities, who provide 20% of the funding. The authorities themselves are joint lead agencies for the Crime and Disorder Act and are responsible for implementing it. Candidates would need to meet the same criteria as mayoral nominees.
2.1.16 The most practical option for selecting Borough representatives would be nomination by the Association of London Government (ALG). The ALG is made up of an elected member from each of the London boroughs. In the same way as the mayoral candidates, nominees will need to meet selection criteria reflecting the requirements of the GLMCA.
Q7. Should the local authorities be represented on the Authority? If so, in what proportion/number?
Q8. What skills or experience should be reflected in the selection criteria for the selection Borough representatives?
Specialist Expertise
2.1.17 The question arises whether professional functional expertise (for example in finance or human resources) should be provided through members of the Authority, through officers employed by the Authority or both. If the first option, consideration needs to be given whether they should be integral members of the authority, or co-opted as and when necessary. Depending on the circumstances, a mixture of all three options may be necessary.
2.1.18 If it is decided that specialist experts should be integral members of the GLMCA, it would appear to be most appropriate for the GLMCA (or the shadow body) to make the selection.
Q9. Should functional specialists be integral members of the authority, co-opted as and when required, and/or employed as officers by the authority?
Q10. Who should appoint the "specialist" members of the Authority (if any)?
The Chairman
2.1.19 In other MCCs, the chairman is elected by the rest of the committee. By definition, the chairman is therefore always a magistrate. Given that the GLMCA will include a proportion of non- magisterial members, this raises a question about who should be the chairman.
Q11. Should the chairman necessarily be a magistrate, or should all members of the authority be eligible?
Q12. If the Chairman needs to be a magistrate, who should be eligible to elect him or her; just magistrate members or all members of the Authority?
Position of the Justices Chief Executive
2.1.20 MCCs have traditional been comprised of magistrates as "non-executive" members. The Clerk to the Committee/JCE provides the secretariat functions, and has invariably attended meetings but not as a member. The issue arises whether this is the right model for the GLMCA or whether the JCE and/or other "executive" directors should be full members.
2.1.21 The role of the GLMCA is to decide strategy, set standards and to monitor, and be accountable for, implementation and achievement. It is in this context that the question of whether the JCE should also be a member of the GLMCA needs to be considered. One relevant point is whether it would confuse the hierarchy of accountability, under which the JCE will be accountable to the GLMCA for the performance of his/her functions, if he/she were also to be a member of it.
Q13. Should the JCE be a member of the GLMCA? If so, why?
2.2.1 As mentioned in the Introduction, the GLMCA will be set up as from 1 April 2001. Experience from previous MCC amalgamations has shown that a period of running by a shadow committee for at least 12 months is essential in order to ensure a smooth transition to the new organisation.
2.2.2 However, a problem in the setting up of a shadow GLMCA arises because the elections for the Mayor and Greater London Assembly will not be held until May 2000. This means that there can be no Mayoral appointments until June 2000 at the very earliest, leaving a maximum of 9 months before the GLMCA is established. If the shadow authority were to have the same composition as the final GLMCA (i.e. including mayoral nominees), it would only have a maximum of 9 months to undertake all the activities required to ensure a smooth transition to full operation on 1 April 2001. Experience from previous amalgamations suggests that this would not be feasible, especially with an authority of this size and nature, because of the magnitude and timescale of key tasks which need to be undertaken, e.g. tendering for, and establishing, an accounting system.
2.2.3 In order for the shadow authority to have enough time to prepare for implementation there are therefore two options:
The shadow authority could be incomplete for the first part of its shadow running, i.e. without mayoral representatives. This smaller shadow Authority would still possess full executive powers to make and implement decisions relating to establishing the GLMCA e.g. setting up an accounting system, and appointing a JCE. However, it would only make long term strategic decisions once the Mayoral nominees join.
The only other alternative would be for "other members" to substitute for the mayoral nominees during the shadow period. This, in turn, begs the question as to who these other members should be? It also has the disadvantage of causing an unnatural division between those responsible for establishing the GLMCA, and those responsible for its subsequent effective operation.
Q14. How should the shadow authority be constituted prior to the arrival of the mayoral representatives? (As a smaller authority initially but with executive powers or with the mayoral nominees substituted by other members?).
Q15. If you favour the substitution option, who do you suggest should make up the numbers and how should they be selected?
Q16. Is there any other viable option for the shadow authority apart from the two options outlined?
2.2.4 In addition to the functions of a normal shadow MCC, the shadow GLMCA will need to undertake additional functions. The activities to be undertaken by the shadow GLMCA which we have identified are as follows:-
to commence and sustain the running of the authority as a shadow authority;
to make all necessary preparations for the assumption of its functions as both an MCC and as the Authority on 1 April 2001;
to prepare its budget and to consult with the local authorities on that budget;
to set the levy for raising 20% of its net expenditure from the local authorities;
to make any determinations under either JPA 1997 or the Access to Justice Bill;
to draw up a job description, advertise and appoint a justices' chief executive together with any necessary support staff and specialist staff;
to prepare strategic plans;
to consider whether any co-options to the authority are necessary or desirable;
to arrange for the discharge of any of its functions under either JPA 97 or the Access to Justice Bill;
to set up the GLMCA fund;
to set up accounting system;
to arrange for the transfer of properties where applicable;
to arrange payroll services;
to make arrangements for security;
to make arrangements for the administration of the pensions schemes;
to make arrangements for appointing internal auditors.
Q17. Do you think the list includes any functions which the shadow authority is not required to undertake?
Q18. Are there any additional functions which you think the Shadow Authority should undertake?
2.3.1 In common with MCCs in all other parts of England and Wales, the GLMCA will be responsible for the effective and efficient administration of the courts in its area. However, all agencies in the criminal justice system are agreed that London is sufficiently different and of a size to warrant different administrative arrangements from those elsewhere. It is, for example, possibly too large an area for service delivery at courthouse level across the whole area to be managed directly from the top level, and therefore needs to be divided into more manageable sub-units. Along with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in London and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) we need to consider the most effective management structure, which will in turn determine the type of sub-structure which is most appropriate. The sub-structures chosen need to provide effective workable solutions for each individual agency, whilst at the same time facilitating the co-ordination within the criminal justice system (cjs). We are not seeking to introduce unnecessary tiers of management - our objective is a lean structure with a focus on the delivery of the business in the courts.
2.3.2 An initial question is how many senior managers, apart from the JCE, should be responsible for functions across the whole of London? Finance and personnel directors are examples which immediately spring to mind. The next question is whether there should be operational managers responsible for the day-to-day running of the courts as an "intermediate" level between London as a whole and individual courthouses. If so, it would then need to be decided what is the most effective number of sub-divisions for the GLMCA, and on what basis should that sub- division be made? This in turn will depend in part upon how many functions are retained at the top level and how many devolved to be dealt with at a lower level. Irrespective of the number finally decided upon, we believe there are a couple of basic ground-rules which are essential for effective working, and for co-ordination both with the other cjs agencies and the local authorities. These are that "divisional" boundaries should not cut across borough boundaries; and divisions of the various cjs agencies should, wherever possible, match or "nest" rather than cut across each other, i.e. the smaller unit (from whichever agency) should nest completely within the larger. Whilst accepting that the sub-structures of the various cjs agencies need not be exactly coterminous at every level, alignment of boundaries - where possible - clearly facilitates communication and co-ordination between the agencies which the reorganisations within each agency are designed to facilitate.
2.3.3 Representatives of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), City of London Police Service (City), Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), Greater London Probation Service (GLPS), Crown Courts' Service (CCS) and Magistrates Courts Service (MCS) have been meeting as a working group to examine the possibilities and issues arising from the objective to increase alignment of boundaries between the various agencies. There is a consensus within the group for having a London-wide "Chief Executive" for each service, and for delivery to be "borough based". In the case of the magistrates' courts it is recognised that not every borough has its own courthouse, and one courthouse may, therefore, serve more than one borough.
2.3.4 The division of London for intermediate management purposes may follow a slightly differing pattern for each service, based on their specific operational requirements and workload.
The MPS are possibly moving towards a 3 sector division of the Greater London area, approximating to a North, South and smaller Central area. Management of each of the 3 sectors is likely to be delegated to an Assistant Commissioner. Decisions on this are likely to be announced during the consultation period for this paper.
The GLPS and CPS are likely to divide London into 3 or 4 divisions for management purposes, but we do not yet know the geographical basis for them. The CPS are likely to reach decisions on this shortly to facilitate their establishing the new CPS London area in the light of the Glidewell recommendations.
The CCS are likely to manage the area with 10-12 managers, probably based on court centres.
2.3.5 The Central Area in the MPS Model. The MPS model is unique in having one significantly smaller area, the Central area. It comprises Westminster, Kensington, Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham and is maintained as a separate area, despite the disparity in size, because of the different policing requirements relating to security associated with diplomatic and royalty protection. There does not appear to be a similarly convincing rationale for any of the other agencies.
2.3.6 The options for a GLMCA management sub-structure are given below. For each of these options the divisions could "nest" or align with the potential MPS boundaries, and possibly other agency boundaries depending on the options the other agencies choose.
2 (or 3) divisions. This would basically divide London into a "North" and "South" division (with the option of a much smaller third "Central" division including the City). This option could align with the MPS option. If the GLMCA opted for 2 divisions, the boroughs in the MPS Central area, and the City, would be kept together - and placed within one or other division, probably the North. For comparison, these 2 divisions would be approximately the same size in terms of weighted case load as the current Inner London MCS.
4 (or 5) divisions. This consists of the area being divided into four segments; approximately North East (NE), South East (SE), South West (SW) and North West (NW) divisions. These divisions could align with the 2 division option, thus maximising coterminosity where possible. This option could also incorporate a separate central area, as in option (i), if desired.
8 - 10 divisions. For this option, the boroughs would be clustered into groups of 3 or 4. They could be clustered in such a way as to "nest" within the borders of the MPS and possibly other cjs agencies. Again, it would probably make sense for the police Central area plus the City to be included in one cluster, to avoid cutting across boundaries. The disadvantages of this option are the same as those for the courthouse based option below, but less severe.
38 courthouse based divisions. This would change over time depending on the number of courthouses in use. It would do away with an intermediate tier of management. However, a disadvantage of this option is that the large number of divisions would result in inefficient use of resources due to the replication of functions for each division. Also, 38 courthouse managers is an unwieldy number for effective reporting to, and management by, the chief executive.
2.3.7 Quite apart from the operational managers who would be needed, the question arises whether the GLMCA should set up sub-committees responsible for each division. If so, it would need to be decided how this sub-committee structure would relate to the GLMCA and to the JCE and operational managers to ensure there were clear lines of responsibility and accountability. Conventional management practice, would suggest that a single individual (an "assistant or deputy JCE"), rather than a committee, should be responsible for the management of each division, and be accountable to the JCE. In every other cjs agency, the responsibility for managing each division will be vested in a single individual.
2.3.8 Once the other agencies' proposals are known, alignment with their boundaries will be an influencing factor where there is little difference between options on management grounds alone, for example between options i and ii above.
2.3.9 The outcome of this consultation paper will inform the structure of the GLMCA at its inception. Subsequently we suggest that the GLMCA should submit proposals for changes to the administrative sub-divisions to the Lord Chancellor for approval.
Q19. What number of subdivisions do you think will facilitate the most effective administration of the courts' service, and on what basis do you think the subdivisions should be made?
Q20. Do you think there should be a separate "central" division for magistrates' courts' purposes? If so, what area should it include, and why?
Q21. Does it matter if the divisions are of significantly different sizes (i.e. workload) e.g. by having a separate central area?
Q22. Do you think the divisions should be headed by a committee or a single individual ("deputy Justices' Chief Executive")?
2.4.1 Whatever management structure is created there will be a large number of issues affecting both magistrates and staff which, over time, the GLMCA will need to determine. For example, it will be able to bring forward proposals for changes to the existing commission areas (the basis for summary jurisdiction and appointment of magistrates) and petty sessions areas (where magistrates sit). It will draw up an accommodation strategy and reach decisions on its courthouse needs, and what, if any, centralisation of functions should be undertaken. It will also need to decide upon its clerkship structure, including the number of justices' clerks, and to consider terms and conditions for all staff. Some of these areas are covered by statutory requirements for consultation.
2.4.2 In managing the service across London as a whole, it will clearly be essential that the GLMCA has appropriate mechanisms in place for consulting both magistrates and staff. These mechanisms clearly go further than the existing statutory requirements. Views are invited on whether regulations should be made prescribing any particular mechanisms for consultation.
Q23. What are the appropriate arrangements for consultation? Should any of these be prescribed in regulations?
This section covers issues where, following discussion with other Government Departments and representatives of the Magistrates' Courts Service, the proposals outlined below appear to be the best way forward and will therefore be reflected in broad outline in the Bill. However we welcome views and comment about the detail of the proposals below to ensure we have fully explored the practical implications of the policies and have provided for a workable way forward in practice.
Current financial arrangements
3.1.1 The 21 MCCs of outer London and the City of London are funded by paying (local) authorities who recoup 80% of the net cost from the Lord Chancellor's Department in the form of specific grant. This is the same as the situation elsewhere throughout England and Wales.
3.1.2 Inner London is slightly different in that the Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District is the paying authority for the Inner London MCC, and precepts on the 12 inner London local authorities for their 20% contribution, with the 80% balance being met as usual by way of specific grant support from the Lord Chancellor's Department.
3.1.3 The MCCs' expenses are paid by the paying authority, who are also responsible for keeping proper accounts. The paying authority can appeal against the MCC's determination of the budget.
New Financial Arrangements
3.1.4 The GLMCA will become its own "paying authority" i.e. it will receive the 80% specific grant directly from the Lord Chancellor's Department and will levy upon the local authorities for the remaining 20% of its expenditure.
3.1.5 It will therefore become responsible for maintaining its own accounts. In order to meet this need, a statutory obligation will be place upon the GLMCA to set up a fund into which its income (grants from the LCD, payments from the 32 London local authorities to which the GLMCA will issue levies, and other receipts) should be received, and out of which expenses should be met.
3.1.6 There will also be a statutory obligation for accounts to be kept. The manner in which the accounts will be kept has yet to be decided but is likely to be under the Audit Commission Act 1998 or something very similar, in line with the accounting requirements for local authorities and other levying bodies. External audit of the accounts will be undertaken by the Audit Commission.
3.1.7 The GLMCA will consult the local authorities in London on the determination of its budget and they will have the right of appeal to the Lord Chancellor over the GLMCA's determination (as local authorities do in other part of England and Wales). This accountability is important in recognition of the local authorities contribution to the funding of the courts' service.
3.1.8 Although the post of the Receiver is being abolished by the Greater London Authority Bill, transitional arrangements will ensure that a residuary body is retained to continue the functions of the Receiver with respect to ILMCS until the GLMCA is established.
Current pension arrangements
Outer London and the City of London
3.2.1 The terms and conditions of service for the staff of the outer London and the City of London MCCs are analogous to staff working in local government including membership of the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS), a contributory pension scheme (6% of pensionable salary). This is a statutory scheme set out in regulations made under sections 7 and 12 of the Superannuation Act 1972. The latest regulations are "The Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 1997" - SI 1997 No. 1612. In the outer London and the City of London MCCs, there are about 850 employees all of whom are members of the LGPS. The pension funds are administered by each borough and by the Corporation of London.
Inner London
3.2.2 ILMCC is different in that the staff, about 1000, are all members of the Metropolitan Civil Staffs Superannuation Scheme (MCSSS); a non-contributory, pay-as-you-go, pension scheme similar to that enjoyed by civil servants. Again, the ILMCC is different in that it is the Receiver who manages the scheme and pays out the pensions. The Scheme currently pays out to 750 pensioners, costing about £2.741 million, and has 700 past employees with preserved rights. (Note - By virtue of section 15(1)(a)(ii) of the Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1967, staff of the ILMCC have a right to membership of the MCSSS because they are classed as members of the metropolitan civil staffs.)
New pension arrangements
3.2.3 Ideally, any new arrangements should meet the following criteria:
No disturbance for existing and deferred pensioners and minimal change for existing staff;
offer reasonably attractive, flexible and economical pension benefits as part of the remuneration package to future staff;
provide stability in overall costs to both national and local taxpayers; and
provide for the economic and efficient administration of pension arrangements.
3.2.4 After detailed discussions with HM Treasury, Cabinet Office and the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, it was agreed the best solution to be as follows:
all new staff joining the GLMCA on or after its creation on 1 April 2001 will become members of the LGPS; and
the GLMCA should belong to the London Pension Fund Authority (LPFA).
all existing staff currently employed by the outer London MCCs and the City of London MCC, and who are existing members of the LGPS, will remain with the LGPS and have all their pensions administered by the LPFA rather than by the individual local councils. The necessary pension transfers will follow automatically from the individual boroughs once it is clear that the staff are moving to the new statutory body. The GLMCA will be liable for employer contributions which, for the LPFA, are at least 8.7% of pension payroll. The current average employer contribution rate across outer London (and the City of London) lies between 8% and 9%.
existing staff of the ILMCC, pensioners, and those with preserved rights should transfer to the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme (PCSPS). The PCSPS is identical to the MCSSS both in terms and benefits.
3.2.5 For the interim period between the abolition of the Receiver's post and the creation of the GLMCA, the ILMCC pensions will be administered by the "Residuary" Receiver . The necessary clauses will be included in the GLA Bill.
3.2.6 This will mean that the GLMCA will be operating two pension schemes - the PCSPS and the LGPS. Although these two pension schemes, one funded and the other unfunded, will result in differing conditions of service (including different retirement ages), advice to date indicates that this does not give rise to any legal implications.
Background information on the London Pension Fund Authority (LPFA)
3.2.7 The LPFA is the successor pension administering authority to the Greater London Council (GLC). It is responsible for looking after the ex-GLC, and even Middlesex, funds and for paying the pensions of members of those earlier authorities.
3.2.8 It is also responsible for current active members formerly employed by the Inner London Education Authority, and employees of the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority as major employers, plus a number of smaller bodies previously associated with the GLC on a pan-London basis.
3.2.9 Although it is a DETR sponsored body, all of its administration costs are met from the pension fund, as permitted in the LGPS Regulations. After the formation of the GLA, the sponsoring authority will be the GLA rather than DETR. Board appointments are made and approved by DETR at present.
Current Property Arrangements
3.3.1. Section 55 of the JPA '97 places a duty on paying authorities to provide court houses and other accommodation for magistrates' courts purposes. An MCC determines its needs in relation to these courthouses and other accommodation. However, the MCC must consult its paying authority who has a right of appeal to the Lord Chancellor if aggrieved by the MCC's determination. (S.56 JPA 97.)
3.3.2 Each MCC in Greater London has its own paying authority. The paying authorities are: the Common Council of the City of London for the City MCC; the Outer London boroughs for the Outer London MCCs; and the Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District for the Inner London Magistrates' Courts' Committee (ILMCC). (S.58 JPA 79 places the duty to provide the courthouses on the Receiver).
Outer London and the City of London
3.3.3 The majority of magistrates' courts properties in outer London transferred to the local authorities from the Greater London Council (GLC) (the previous paying authority) in 1986, following its abolition. The City courthouse has always been provided by the Corporation of the City of London.
Inner London
3.3.4 As mentioned above, the role of the paying authority is fulfilled by the Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District, in whom all property interests are vested. Since the enactment of the Police and Magistrates' Courts' Act 1994, efforts have been made to disengage the Receiver from his paying authority functions. The position of the Receiver will now be abolished by the Greater London Authority (GLA) Bill. The Bill passes most of the Receiver's responsibilities over to the new Metropolitan Police Authority. However, a residuary Receiver will be retained to fulfil the paying authority role for the ILMCC, and thereby maintain ownership of the inner London properties. This arrangement will continue until the GLMCA is established.
New Property Arrangements
3.3.5 The Access to Justice Bill gives the GLMCA the power to own property. In addition, the Bill will give the Lord Chancellor the power, by Order, to transfer ownership of certain magistrates' courts property to the GLMCA. It is proposed that these Orders will not be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny.
3.3.6 The following paragraphs show how these provisions (and others in the GLA Bill) will affect the magistrates' courts properties in inner and outer London. Given their unique circumstances, the courthouses in the City of London and the Royal Borough of Kingston will be exempt from any transfer provisions. The owning authority in both these instances will be required to make these buildings available to the GLMCA on similar terms and conditions as currently enjoyed as long as required by the GLMCA.
Outer London
3.3.7 Magistrates' courts properties provided by the outer London paying authorities, will be subject to transfer, by order, made under the Access to Justice Bill. Transfer Order(s) will be made on the initiation of the GLMCA who will apply to the Lord Chancellor for the Order to be made. As a general rule, it is not proposed to make financial recompense for these transfers. However, terms of transfer will be considered on a case by case basis should there be convincing justification why compensation should be made. The local authorities will not be able to appeal against a transfer order.
3.3.8 The magistrates' courts accommodation provided by the Royal Borough of Kingston Upon Thames in the Guildhall, will be exempted from any transfer order. The Guildhall has always been in the ownership of the Royal Borough of Kingston Upon Thames. Kingston Upon Thames MCC currently use only approximately 25% of the Guildhall.
3.3.9 The remaining properties in outer London can be grouped into two categories.
Property owned by the local authorities.
3.3.10 This category encompasses the great majority of outer London properties. On transfer, accommodation for other Services e.g. the Crown Prosecution Service and Probation Service, will continue to be made available. A small number of properties have been built since the abolition of the GLC, but in each case these replace property which was transferred to the borough from the GLC.
Property leased by the local authorities.
3.3.11 The leases will also be eligible for transfer to the GLMCA. This category includes the Havering court house, part of the Hendon court house grounds, the offices situated in the Royal Borough of Kingston Upon Thames and other office and garage accommodation.
3.3.12 Until the Lord Chancellor makes such Order(s) transferring a local authority's property, that local authority will be under a statutory duty to provide the GLMCA with accommodation. The terms and conditions of this duty to provide will be clearly specified. A local authority's duty will cease when all of its magistrates' courts property is transferred to the GLMCA, or when the GLMCA relinquishes its interest in the property.
Inner London
3.3.13 All magistrates' courts properties in which the ILMCC is currently the major occupier, will be transferred to the GLMCA on the day the GLMCA is established. The power to make these transfers will be included in the GLA Bill. It is proposed that the GLMCA will make leaseback arrangements for those areas of the property occupied by other services, e.g. the Metropolitan Police Service. The loan debt relating to these properties is managed by the Receiver as part of a much larger pool of debt relating to police property. It is proposed that the loan debt remains as part of this pool, which will transfer to the Metropolitan Police Authority, if the cost of separating it is significant. If it remains with the police, the cost of maintaining the debt will be paid from magistrates' courts funding as now.
3.3.14 It should be noted that despite these changes the local authorities right to appeal to the Lord Chancellor against a court house closure, will remain. This will be the case even after transfers in inner and outer London have taken place.
Annex E lists the properties currently occupied by the outer London MCCs.
We would be grateful if the relevant MCCs and local authorities could confirm the accuracy of this list, and notify us of any errors or omissions.
Background
4.1. The Government believes that greater alignment of boundaries of the criminal justice agencies is a significant factor in achieving its objectives of improving efficiency and effectiveness, reducing delay, and improving co-ordination within the criminal justice system. To this end it has been decided to replace the existing 22 Magistrates' Courts' Committees (MCCs) in London with a single body, the Greater London Magistrates' Courts Authority (GLMCA) on 1st April 2001. As well as having the same role and responsibilities of an MCC in any other part of the country, due to the size and unique nature of the capital the GLMCA will have additional powers and responsibilities to enable it to operate strategically and effectively.
4.2. The paragraphs below summarise the questions being asked in this consultation document, and the policies proposed. Details of the background to each topic, and the rationale behind the questions and decisions can be found in the relevant section of the document.
Section A
4.3 This section covers issues where respondents' views are sought on the following:
4.3.1. Composition - The size and nature of the GLMCA are such that the authority may need a different make-up from that of a traditional MCC. It is proposed that the authority should be made up of; magistrates, mayoral nominees, representatives of the London Boroughs, and possibly functional specialists. Views are sought as to:
the size of the authority (should it vary significantly from that of other MCCs, and if so, why?).
the composition of the authority and the selection methods used; (What should the ratio of magistrates to non- magistrates be? Should selection panels or appointment by an independent third party be used for magistrates? If the former, how could a practical size panel be reached? Should there be places for stipendiary magistrates? What percentage of places should the mayor's nominees occupy? Should there be local authority representation? What skills and experience should the mayoral and local authority representatives have? Should there be functional specialists? Should the chairman necessarily be a magistrate? Who should elect the chairman?).
the position of the JCE; (Should the JCE be a member of the authority?).
4.3.2 Shadow Authority - The date of the elections for the Mayor and Greater London Assembly (May 2000) poses a dilemma for the appointment and effective working of the shadow authority; Mayoral nominees will not be available until June 2000 at the very earliest, which significantly shortens the period when the shadow committee would be up to full strength. The tasks to be undertaken by the shadow committee will also differ to those of a normal shadow MCC. Views are sought as to;
how the shadow authority could be instituted in such a way as to ensure an adequate period of shadow running; (Should it be convened without mayoral nominees but with full executive powers? or should there be substitutions for the mayoral nominees?)
the tasks to be undertaken by the shadow authority.
4.3.3 Substructure - The paper explores the need to divide London into smaller areas for management purposes. It then describes the models which may be followed by the other criminal justice agencies and the possible options for the magistrates' courts service. Views are sought as to;
The number of subdivisions which would be best; whether there should be a separate central division; and whether the divisions should be headed by an individual or a committee.
4.3.4 Communication - Given the size of the GLMCA it is particularly important to ensure that communication with magistrates and staff is effective. Views are sought as to the appropriate arrangements for consultation.
Section B
4.4. This section covers the following issues where the broad outline of the policy has already been determined, but where views are invited to help ensure that the policies are fully workable in practice.
4.4.1 Finance - The GLMCA will be its own "paying authority", i.e. it will receive 80% grant direct from the Lord Chancellor's Department (LCD) and will levy on the local authorities for the remaining 20%. As now, the authorities will have the right of appeal over the determination of the budget.
4.4.2 Pensions - All new staff joining the GLMCA after it is established will become members of the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS). All existing Outer London and City MCC staff will remain as members of the LGPS. All existing Inner London staff (and pensioners) will transfer from the Metropolitan Civil Staffs Superannuation Scheme (MCSSS) to the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme which has identical terms and benefits.
4.4.3 Property - The GLMCA will have the
power to own, acquire and dispose of property. All magistrates' courts
properties currently owned by the Receiver will transfer to the GLMCA
under the GLA Bill. The Lord Chancellor will have the power, by Order,
in response to submissions from the GLMCA, to transfer Outer London
properties or leases to the GLMCA. As a general rule, no financial recompense
is proposed. The City of London and Kingston courthouses will remain
in current ownership due to their unique circumstances, but will continue
to be provided for the use of the GLMCA for as long as they are required.