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» Investigating breaches of the Code

» Model 1

» Model 2

» Model 3

  1. New section 39B(3) of the JPA 1997 provides the Lord Chancellor with the power to make regulations for establishing whether persons have failed to observe the code. It is not proposed to make regulations, at this stage, about these monitoring arrangements. Responsibility for examining the day to day operation of the Code will form part of the JCE's duties.

Investigating breaches of the Code

  1. Section 39B of the JPA 1997 also empowers the Lord Chancellor to suspend or dismiss members of committees or panels who fail to comply with the code, and to provide that a dismissed person may not be re-appointed for a specified period or ever. Should a breach of the code be alleged or identified, an investigation of the facts will be called for.

  2. Three possible models of investigative panels have been identified as viable options. Whichever model is finally settled upon, responsibility will fall to the JCE to convene the investigative panel. Whilst specialist assistance may be called upon, e.g. the Internal Assurance Division of the Lord Chancellor's Department in the case of fraud, the JCE will need to undertake a preliminary investigation before any further action should be taken. Responsibility will fall to the JCE to consider whether to refer any beach to an investigative panel. The JCE should inform Magistrates' Courts Division (MCD) of the Lord Chancellor's Department immediately of any breach, alleged or otherwise and, after undertaking his preliminary investigation, inform MCD as to his proposed course of action.

  3. Model 1. Each MCC to constitute a panel annually composed of 3 MCC/ Selection Panel members [or 3 members nominated by the MCC/ Selection Panel members] to be employed by neighbouring MCCs, as applicable.

  4. Model 2. Each MCC to constitute an internal panel annually composed of: an MCC member; a Selection Panel member; and an independent HM MCSI member i.e. not the local liaison inspector.

  5. Model 3. A national/local panel of 4 members. This panel would be annually composed of 3 members: an independent HM MCSI member i.e. not the local liaison inspector; a Central Council nominee; and an AJCE nominee. When called upon, one final member drawn from the local MCC would join the national element of the panel.

  6. These models were settled after a number of discussions, both internal and with stakeholders e.g. Central Council of Magistrates' Courts Committees; Association of Justices' Chief Executives; Justices' Clerks Society; Magistrates' Association; and HM MCSI.

  7. Some of the advantages and disadvantages to each model are rehearsed below. The list is by no means exhaustive.

Model 1

•   Advantages

•   Disadvantages

Model 2

•   Advantages

•   Disadvantages

Model 3

•   Advantages

•   Disadvantages

In the highly unlikely event that there is more than one alleged breach, the panel may experience conflicting priorities, in responding to requests to investigate.

Q8. Of these three models of investigative panels outlined above, which model do you prefer?

 

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